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Executive summary 
 
The study “Review of voluntary approaches in the European Union” has been 
conducted in the context of the project “Feasibility study on demonstration of 
voluntary approaches for industrial environmental management in China” and 
aims at evaluating the experience with voluntary agreements between industry and 
public authorities in the European Union. It is part of a comparative study 
between Europe and China. The study aims at providing a basis for adoption and 
further development of voluntary agreements in China. Therefore, conceptual 
information and case studies are presented in order to illustrate the instrument, its 
chances and risks as well as success factors. 
Voluntary agreements are widely spread over the European Union. But there are 
considerable differences between the member states: In some European countries, 
only a few agreements have been concluded whereas in e.g. the Netherlands and 
Germany agreement schemes and more than 100 separate agreements cover a 
range of different sectors and environmental issues. In order to define voluntary 
agreements two aspects must be highlighted: Firstly, industry has to participate 
voluntarily. Secondly, there is an interaction between the public authorities on the 
one hand and industry on the other hand in order to enforce environmental action. 
Some voluntary agreements examined in this study are closer to self-commitments 
of industry where interaction with public authorities is low, while others demand 
intense negotiations with public authorities and end up in a legally binding civil 
law contract. Public schemes (like ISO 14001), in which companies can 
participate voluntary as well, are not covered in this study. 
To provide a better picture of European practice, a choice of four good practice 
agreements is presented in case studies. The Dutch Long Term Agreements (LTA) 
and the benchmarking covenant on energy efficiency, the European ACEA-
agreement on the reduction of CO2 emissions from passenger cars, the Czech 
Agreement on gradual reduction of impact of laundry detergents on the environ-
ment and the German industry’s commitment on phasing out of polybrominated 
diphenylethers (PBDE) as flame-retardants in synthetic materials were analysed. 
Selection was not only based on the success of the agreements but also on the 
transferability to China and the fact that a range of agreement types, environ-
mental issues and sectors should be covered. These cases have been evaluated 
regarding problem solving capacity, i.e. environmental effectiveness, legitimacy 
and costs. As environmental effectiveness can hardly be measured directly, the 
analysis focused on the ambitiousness of targets and the compliance with the 
agreed targets. 
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Each of the presented agreements has its strengths and weaknesses. The German 
and European examples have a good performance according to the existence of 
quantitative and measurable targets. Intermediate targets are helpful as well. The 
critical aspect of the ACEA case is ambitiousness of targets. E.g. the case of 
Dutch Long Term Agreements shows that it is useful to carry out studies to check 
the technological and organisational potential for energy efficiency. The Czech 
case shows that a concrete time horizon, introduced rather lately, is important and 
soft targets like consumer information can be hardly supervised. A weakness of 
the Czech detergent agreement is the rather limited sanction fee. However, the 
working group, like in the Dutch LTA, led to soft effects like learning and infor-
mation dissemination. In contrast to that, the strong political framing is a strength 
of the LTA and the benchmarking covenant. It is embedded in a policy mix with 
incentives and sanctions to promote compliance. In addition, an independent 
government agency is involved in a comprehensive monitoring and guards the 
implementation of the agreement. Besides the Dutch example, the European and 
Czech case provide good monitoring mechanisms for an effective supervision of 
the agreements as well. 
Generally speaking, success factors incorporate a comprehensive target setting 
with a time frame and a structured process organisation. Monitoring procedures 
and methodologies are an important feedback mechanism to push action and 
ensure compliance. Last but not least, the compliance pressure through in-built 
and external incentives and sanctions (framing) as well as the integration in a 
policy mix leads to a successful implementation of the policy instrument. 
Furthermore, there are some supportive factors for the emergence of voluntary 
agreements such as a policy culture of mutual trust between government and 
industry and the willingness to co-operate. In addition, the existence of a credible 
threat and a homogeneous industry sector support emergence.  
This study provides information to 
develop a model for China and the city 
of Nanjing. To support this task, finally 
nine steps are identified that lead to 
successful voluntary agreements: 
 
1 Appoint problems and define targets
2      Establish a cooperation
4     Negotiate on targets, measures and monitoring
5    Conclude and implement the agreement
6 Control action through monitoring
7 Promote information dissemination
8        Communicate intermediate reports
9       Apply sanctions if needed
3 Offer incentives
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1 Introduction 
 
Voluntary agreements are a relatively new factor in environmental policy in 
Europe. In the 1990s, the use of voluntary approaches was one of the most rapidly 
growing — in terms of number and scope — policy instrument for environmental 
management in Europe. Trying to avoid problems occurring in using 'command-
and-control' and economic instruments, industry leaders and government policy-
makers, de facto, have created voluntary approaches. Thus, voluntary agreements 
are neither the product of government intervention, nor of political scientists' theo-
ries. Voluntary agreements are pragmatic responses to the need for more flexible 
ways to implement measures and complex environmental problems (Highley, 
Convery, Lévêque 2001). 
Today, at the conceptual level, there is general consensus that sustainable 
development cannot be achieved through a regulatory approach alone (UNEP 
2000). Voluntary agreements are needed to meet the complex challenges of 
sustainable development. However, each policy instrument is having its own 
benefits and limits. Therefore, the chances and risks were an important subject in 
scientific debate as well.  
This study contributes to the discussion in terms of providing a basis for 
discussing European experiences with a new perspective: A transfer of the 
approach of joint action between public authorities and industry to China. 
Although few attempts to introduce voluntary agreements in China exist (Price et 
al. 2003), it is a challenging task to support such a comprehensive implementation 
process. This review of experiences with voluntary agreements in Europe 
provides a basis for the development of an adoptable model. 
1.1 Background 
The study is part of a project called “Feasibility Study on Demonstration of 
Voluntary Approaches for Industrial Environmental Management in China”. The 
project is financed within the AsiaProEco-programme of the European Union, 
which is designed to strengthen the environmental dialogue between Europe and 
Asia. It is lead by the Dutch Energy-agency SenterNovem. 
The project aims at evaluating the experience with voluntary or negotiated agree-
ments between industry and public authorities within the European Union and 
adopting it to the Chinese context. The project is focussing on the City of Nanjing 
where heavy industry is responsible for a high rate of different emissions. It is 
intended that Nanjing will become a National Environmental Model City in 
China. To achieve this goal, a group of 29 companies in Nanjing are involved in 
the project. Furthermore, the project will identify both the positive and negative 
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factors influencing the adoption of the voluntary environmental management 
approaches in China.  
Based on the overall goals, the project incorporates three basic elements:  
• To review different European voluntary environmental management 
approaches and provide a systematic analysis on advantages and disadvantages 
of command-and-control instruments in China;  
• To assess the feasibility of voluntary approaches for environmental manage-
ment under Chinese framework-conditions and survey the expectations of 
companies and the willingness to participate; and 
• To develop a suitable voluntary environmental management model for China. 
Within these steps, several communicative actions are integrated: Besides three 
workshops a course and study tour in Europe will be organised for the Chinese 
public environmental authorities and companies' environmental managers. 
The Wuppertal Institute is responsible for scientific support. Its central task is to 
carry out the review of voluntary approaches in the European Union. This Review 
of European experiences is part of a comparative study conducted in the second 
phase of the project. The Environmental Management College of China (EMCC) 
provided a similar review of Chinese experiences with command-and -control 
instruments. Both together formed a basis for a comparative analysis of industrial 
environmental management approaches in China and in European countries. The 
Nanjing Environmental Protection Bureau (NJEPB) was responsible for this task. 
During the preparation of the study, the Wuppertal Institute was supported by 
SenterNovem. The results of the European review were provided to the Chinese 
partners in a first draft. The comments of SenterNovem, NJEPB and EMCC as 
well several contributions from the attendants of the first joint project workshop in 
Nanjing on February 3–4, 2005 were integrated in the final version. After the 
workshop the study was revised and completed. 
1.2 Objectives and methodology 
The aim of the study “Review of Voluntary Approaches in the European Union” 
(activity four of the project proposal) is to provide the Chinese counterparts a 
systematic analysis of European experiences with voluntary agreements. The 
results — together with a parallel review of Chinese command-and-control 
environmental management — will be the basis for assessing the opportunities to 
adapt voluntary approaches in China. Different types of voluntary approaches are 
discussed; nevertheless the study will focus on voluntary agreements between 
industry and public authorities. Public environmental management schemes like 
ISO 14001 are not considered in order to focus the scope of the study. 
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To reach the objectives, the study highlights two aspects: On the one hand, 
detailed descriptions will endorse the general understanding of voluntary agree-
ments. On the other hand, the evaluation of European experiences should lead to 
identify success factors and risks. 
The main research questions are: 
• Why are voluntary agreements for environmental management increasingly 
adopted?  
• What kind of chances and risks has the voluntary approach? 
• What types of agreements exist? 
• Which role do they play in effective environmental management? 
To answer these questions, the study is based on a combination of different 
methodologies.  
A basic method is a literature review to present the state of the art in political 
science and economy. Types and characteristics as well as chances and risks of 
agreements were subject to scientific debate since the late 1990s. To gain com-
prehensive information about the state of the art in European agreements, a broad 
internet-recherché was carried out and several telephone and e-mail contacts were 
made with national and international experts, administration and practitioners (see 
references). Based on the recherché and the literature analysis a screening of 
existing case studies provided more detailed information concerning addressed 
policy issues, types, involved sectors, geographical distribution and trends. 
The main methodological approach is the concept of four comparative case 
studies. Based on the above-described recherché in European Union member 
states as well as on European level, four case studies were selected (methodology 
of selection see chap. 4.1). These case studies provide more detailed information 
about the design as well as the success of the European experiences. The case 
studies highlight the success factors of voluntary agreements. This approach was 
chosen to provide a constructive basis for adopting different elements.  
Within the case studies, again different methods are used: A secondary analysis of 
existing cases studies and an additional internet-recherché were used to describe 
and evaluate the performance. In addition, some (telephone) interviews with 
involved people were conducted as well. The evaluation took the form of an 
assessment regarding problem solving capacity, legitimacy and costs. Based on 
these categories, a comparative multi-case analysis led to the formulation of more 
general success factors. 
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1.3 Content of the report 
The study contains six chapters: Following the introduction, the second chapter 
includes information about the context of policy-making in the European Union in 
order to show some central differences to China. The third chapter describes the 
development of voluntary approaches in Europe. Starting point is the definition of 
types. Based on an analysis of literature the reasons, functions and advantages of 
choosing voluntary agreements are illustrated. This is followed by a description of 
the geographical and sectoral distribution. 
To provide a more profound picture about European experiences, the fourth 
chapter focuses on successful cases from different European countries. Based on 
the detailed description of four examples more comprehensive conclusions about 
success factors will be presented in chapter five. In addition to that, context 
information and conditions for the emergence of voluntary agreements in Europe 
are presented in order to relate these factors to the institutional and political back-
ground.  
Finally, to provide a starting point for the comparative study and the development 
of a model, the sixth and concluding chapter gives some preliminary and general 
suggestions for a transformation of European experiences to other countries. 
Thereby, nine steps how to come to successful voluntary agreements are 
identified. 
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2 European environmental policy 
 
As pollution does not stop at national borders and the opening of the market also 
affects environmental legislation, the European Union addresses the issue of 
environmental protection. Complex environmental problems like climate change 
could not be tackled without joint action by all EU countries. Voluntary environ-
mental agreements on European level are a relatively new policy instrument. The 
main characteristic is that they represent common action of public and industrial 
actors to address environmental problems. They are independent from the 
decision-making level but were developed mainly on national (between govern-
ments and industry) and European (between the European Commission and 
industry) level. Nevertheless, one can find examples on the regional and local 
level, too. 
The evolution of environmental policy on European level 
Economic regulation is highly connected with environmental aspects. Due to the 
raise of awareness about environmental problems, the subject “environment” 
became more important on the European level at the Paris summit in 1972. A high 
quality of living was approved as a European objective. As a consequence, the 
first Environmental Action Programme, established in 1973, can be considered as 
the first concrete step towards a European environmental policy (Schwarz 2002). 
After ten to 15 years of environmental legislation (e.g. the introduction of 
Environmental Impact Assessment in 1985), supranational actors like the Euro-
pean Commission (EC) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as well as 
national governments supported the recognition of environmental policies as 
important domain. That was the reason for incorporating the aspect of environ-
ment into the Single European Act in 1987. Furthermore, the Single European Act 
raised the awareness that creating a single market would generate new require-
ments for policy making, such as stronger coordination rather than further 
specialisation. 
In the EU 1997 treaty reform of Amsterdam environmental protection follows the 
principle of Environmental Policy Integration. This means that environmental 
objectives should be already considered in all sectoral policy initiatives. Since the 
European Council in Cardiff in 1998, the idea has been implemented more con-
cretely. For example, the European Environmental Agency (EEA) has set up the 
Transport and Environmental Reporting Mechanisms (TERM). The publication of 
the European Union’s Sustainable Development Strategy at the Gothenburg 
Summit in 2001 marked another milestone (European Commission 2001a). The 
proposed integration of environmental concerns into sector policies combined 
with the current debate on the White Paper on new governance instruments 
(European Commission 2001b) indicates the level of uncertainty about future 
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trends in the environmental sector as well as related policies and shows the search 
for new instruments. 
Policy instruments and voluntary agreements 
Even if there are differences between the countries, European-level policies are a 
good example for policy instruments in Europe. Until now, the EU has adopted 
over 200 environmental protection directives that have to be applied in all 
member states. Most of the directives are designed to prevent air and water 
pollution and encourage waste disposal. Other major issues include nature 
conservation and the supervision of dangerous industrial processes.  
These are some examples for environmental policy instruments, which have been 
drawn up at the European level and been implemented in the EU member states: 
• Emission standards for vehicles (1970/2001): Vehicles are classified into 
categories and targets for the car-fleet are set up (Directive 2001/116/EC 
amending Directive 70/156/EEC); 
• Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (1985/1997): The impact on the 
environment of public and private projects from a certain significance has to be 
assessed in advance in order to prevent negative impacts from these projects on 
the environment (Directive 1997/11/EC amending Directive 85/337/EEC); 
• Eco-labelling (2000): A Community eco-label has been developed that shall 
promote products which have a reduced environmental impact compared with 
other products of the same product group (European Community 2000); 
• European Climate Change Programme (2000): This programme supports the 
implementation of the EU’s target under the Kyoto-Protocol which aims at 
cutting its greenhouse gas emissions by eight percent until 2012. The most 
important measure under this programme is an Europe wide emissions trading 
scheme which has been implemented from 2005 on (European Commission 
2000); 
• Community system of environmental management and auditing (EMAS) 
(2001): The objective of EMAS is to promote improvements in the environ-
mental performance of organisations in all sectors through the introduction and 
implementation of environmental management schemes (European Community 
2001); 
• Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) (2001): The impact on the environ-
ment of plans and programmes from a certain significance has to be assessed in 
advance in order to reduce impacts from these projects on the environment 
(Directive 2001/42/EC). 
• Energy Tax (2004): The Energy Tax Directive (2003/96/EC) has come into 
force not until May 2004. The Community system of minimum rates, which for 
a long time was confined to mineral oils, is extended to coal, natural gas and 
electricity. This system sets the minimum rates of taxation applicable to energy 
products when used as motor or heating fuels and to electricity.  
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• European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) (2005): 
The scheme is based on a directive that is adopted in October 2003 (Directive 
2003/87/EC) aiming to implement the target set in the Kyoto-Protocol. With a 
fixed limit of their annual CO2 emissions, companies could either reduce their 
CO2 emissions and sell their “allowances” or have to buy them due to their poor 
performance in CO2 emissions reduction. 
In this context, the development of voluntary approaches can be interpreted as a 
contribution to the limits of conventional policy instruments in the field of 
regulation and command-and-control. Together with other new modes of 
governance, like framework directives that are open for flexible implementation, 
or public schemes like the EMAS-system (that extends the ISO 14001 procedure), 
voluntary agreements are an instrument to address policy issues in which conven-
tional regulation is limited. Limitation can be interpreted in two ways:  
Firstly, new challenging environmental problems like climate change cannot be 
addressed by end-of-pipe technologies. In addition, these problems require a wide 
field of measures and coordinated action in a range of actors. Sectors like 
industry, transport, agriculture or energy must be matched with each other. 
Secondly, in order to achieve such a broad approach more flexible and joint action 
between all parts of the society is needed. Long-lasting policy processes and con-
flicts between environmental and industrial interests might counteract an efficient 
problem solving.  
Voluntary agreements are only one part of this widening of instruments. In most 
cases in Europe they do not replace regulation but extend environmental thinking 
to new areas. Thus, the new modes of governance exist side by side to regulation 
and economic instruments like energy taxes and emissions trading. In Europe, 
most of the cases of voluntary agreements are embedded in a policy mix. This mix 
can be interpreted as a strategic and multi-fold approach to the integration of 
environmental objectives in other policy areas. 
Furthermore, it has to be considered that even after nearly 50 years of integration 
each member state still has a particular institutional setting. All nations are 
democracies with highly evolved and heterogeneous policies and differing policy 
cultures. While e.g. Germany is a federal nation state with strong regional govern-
ments, France and Great Britain are highly centralised. In environmental policy, 
some countries can be described as forerunners (e.g. Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands) whereas other countries can be characterised as laggards (e.g. south 
and east European countries). Variation in the policy culture like consensus 
orientated (e.g. the Netherlands) or more hierarchical cultures (e.g. Germany or 
Italy) are important as well. More differences exists in aspects like corporatist 
structures representing the relations between business and labour interest assoc-
iations and the government which are more or less developed in EU member states. 
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Generally speaking, the countries differ in various matters. Hence, the use of 
voluntary agreements is quite heterogeneous. An analysis of the emergence of 
voluntary agreements must keep in mind the diverse institutional settings and 
legal systems. Hence, the transfer to other countries like China must consider 
possible restrictions of the legal system. Nevertheless, it is possible to learn from 
good and bad practice aspects of European experiences. But for adopting instru-
ments it is crucial to analyse which feature will be important in the target country. 
Therefore, the approach of carrying out a comparative study is a comprehensive 
but necessary task of the project. Furthermore, also further links to the Kyoto 
targets of industrial countries and possible supporting measures through the Clean 
Development Mechanisms (CDM) should be addressed. 
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3 Voluntary agreements in Europe 
 
There is a high number of voluntary approaches in the European Union and one 
can look back on more than 30 years of practice. This paper concentrates on 
experiences in the EU. Experiences from outside the EU like Canada or Japan, 
where a high number of voluntary agreements has been concluded as well, are not 
covered by this study. However, before analysing some examples of voluntary 
approaches more in detail, it is necessary to introduce some general definitions 
and categories. 
3.1 The range of voluntary agreements 
Even if voluntary approaches have been part of the policy mix in Europe at least 
since the 1970s, the raise of its use, its presentation as a governance concept as 
well as its growing importance occurs relatively recent. Starting point for environ-
mental agreements was the will to find solutions for concrete environmental 
problems, in which cases regulation or economic instruments did not work 
properly or political support was too weak for implementation. For that reason, 
public authorities and industry began to try to find other ways of policy-making in 
order to solve environmental problems. Hence, voluntary agreements are an 
example for a “new mode” of governance. 
3.1.1 Two types of agreements 
An opportunity to put the instrument of voluntary approaches in more concrete 
terms is the categorisation proposed by the OECD. Due to the different involve-
ment of stakeholders, two main types of voluntary agreements can be distin-
guished (OECD 2003: 18 f.):1 
• Unilateral commitments made by industry 
This form of voluntary approach consists of a unilateral commitment by a firm 
or industry to voluntarily abate pollution or tackle another environmental 
problem. The definition of environmental targets and the provisions how to 
reach this target is determined by industry. These commitments consist of 
environmental programmes that are communicated to employees, clients, and 
the public or public authorities.  
 
• Agreements negotiated between industry and public authorities 
Agreements can be defined as a commitment or contract for environmental 
protection that is developed by bargaining between industry and public 
                                                1	  	   The	  OECD	  names	  two	  further	  types	  of	  voluntary	  approaches:	  private	  agreements	  achieved	  through	  direct	  bargaining	  between	  polluters	  and	  pollutes	  and	  public	  programmes	  in	  which	  companies	  can	  take	  part	  voluntarily.	  These	  cases	  of	  voluntary	  approaches	  are	  not	  covered	  by	   this	  study	  because	  there	  aren’t	  any	  negotiations	  between	  a	  public	  authority	  and	  industry.	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authorities (at local, regional, federal or national level). Thus, interaction 
between industry and public authorities is rather high, especially compared to 
other forms of voluntary approaches. At the end of the negotiation process, 
contracts or letters between the public authority and industry are signed; 
usually containing environmental targets for industry as well as a timetable to 
achieve them. On the other hand, the public authorities commit not to 
introduce a new piece of legislation (e.g. a tax) if the targets of the agreement 
are fulfilled by industry. 
 
This study covers the wide range between self-regulation where industry takes 
action voluntarily and conventional regulation or public programmes where public 
authorities decide what kind of action has to be taken by industry. The focus lays 
on agreements, but cases of self-regulation or unilateral commitments are 
considered in this study as well if interaction or negotiations with public authori-
ties have taken place. Pure self-regulation seldom emerges without public pres-
sure and “the shadow of hierarchy”. This term stands for the threat that public 
authorities would use regulation in case of failure.  
In most of the cases, agreements are contracts between a public body and a sector 
organisation of industry or individual companies, setting collective pollution 
abatement targets (Börkey et al 2000: 39). In other cases, the outcome of the 
agreement is an open letter or commitment of industry accepted by the public 
authority by an answer or press release. 
Furthermore, there is a central difference regarding the scale of the policy instru-
ment. It must be distinguished between two levels of voluntary agreements: 
agreement schemes and single agreements (Krämer, Hansen 1999).  
• Agreement schemes are used as a policy instrument. Such a scheme is a part of 
the national environmental policy and can be seen as a framework for specific 
voluntary agreements with sector associations. Examples for agreement 
schemes are the Dutch Long Term Agreements or the German Declaration of 
Industry on Global Warming Prevention.  
• Single voluntary agreements are either concluded with an industrial sector 
association or individual companies. These agreements can be part of an agree-
ment scheme (e.g. the Dutch benchmarking covenant) or exist independently 
(e.g. in the Czech case on detergents or the German phase-out example) (see 
chapter 4).  
Independently from the form they take, voluntary agreements in the EU can have 
a support function that means that these agreements add on existing legislation 
(e.g. existing limits or taxes) or a transition function. In this case, voluntary 
agreements are concluded at a preliminary stage of a legislative process to allow 
quick action. A third possibility is an independent function of voluntary agree-
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ments in cases where they are fully replacing regulation and used as an inde-
pendent environmental policy instrument.  
3.1.2 Relation to conventional policy instruments 
In the context of defining the boundaries of voluntary agreements, Mol et al. 
(2000) propose the two aspects of jointness and voluntariness. The aspect of 
jointness is defined as the extent to which policies are formulated and imple-
mented jointly between public authorities and industry. You can find a continuum 
between high public-private interaction and low public-private interaction (see 
figure 1). The aspect of voluntariness can be measured on a continuum between 
obligatory (command-and-control policies) and voluntary (self-regulation). These 
two criteria allow classifying policies into four categories. While a low degree of 
jointness and a low degree of voluntariness leads to conventional command-and-
control regulation, a rather high degree of jointness and voluntariness indicates 
voluntary agreements. 
Figure 1: Classification of environmental policy instruments 
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The two dimensions of voluntariness and jointness can also be used to explain 
variation of voluntary agreements, which are situated within the lower right side 
quadrant of Figure 1.  
The Dutch covenants for example imply a high level of interaction between public 
authorities and industry on the one hand and contain on the other hand legally 
binding sanctions, which means that voluntariness is less pronounced. In the case 
of German self-commitments, the voluntary element predominates: they are 
usually legally not binding and the only sanctioning mechanism is a threat of 
legislation by public authorities. Regarding jointness, the commitments are less 
developed as industry is the main actor. There are only a few meetings and no 
formal contract is signed. Figure 2 illustrates these two dimensions of agreements. 
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Figure 2:  Dimensions of agreements 
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3.1.3 Additional characteristics 
Together with basic aspects of voluntary agreements like diverse sectors, policy 
issues and spatial foci (from local to global voluntary agreements), there are at least 
five dimensions that can be useful to understand special features and shed light on 
further characteristics of voluntary agreements (Börkey et al. 2000: 11 f.):  
• Product versus process oriented:  
Whereas process oriented approaches aim at improving production processes 
(e.g. at the reduction of emissions which damage the environment), product 
oriented voluntary agreements aim at the product at the end of the production 
process. They have the target to improve the environmental performance of a 
product. An example could be more environmental friendly cars using less 
gasoline and being built of recyclable material. 
 
• Target-based versus implementation based:  
Voluntary agreements can either set pollution abatement targets or the 
implementation procedure how to achieve them. If the parties involved 
negotiate the target it is called target-based. If the pollution abatement target 
has been set previously (e.g. in the framework of the regular legislative 
process by government) the agreement is called implementation based. Its aim 
is the implementation of the existing pollution abatement target (EEA 1997).  
 
• Binding versus non-binding:  
The legal form of a voluntary agreement has considerable implications on its 
outcome. An agreement can be considered to be legally binding, when it 
includes sanctions in case of non-compliance and is enforceable though a 
court’s decision. It depends on the national legal system whether the 
government is allowed to sign a contract with industry.  
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• Individual versus collective liability:  
This criterion underlines the fact that voluntary agreements can be either 
concluded with single firms or a sector association or group of firms. In case 
of collective liability, industry or an industry sector is collectively liable for 
the implementation of the agreement and will be sanctioned collectively in 
case of failure. Free riding can be limited in case of an individual agreement as 
the performance of all participating companies is controlled. 
 
• Open versus closed access to third parties:  
Voluntary approaches do not necessarily involve third parties, as they are not 
part of the legislative process. But community organisations or environmental 
groups play an increasing role in voluntary approaches. 
 
As shown in this chapter the range of experiences with voluntary agreements in 
Europe is quite large. Between the two poles of voluntary commitments and 
voluntary agreements as legally binding contracts, a variety of problems are 
addressed in numerous ways. Voluntary agreements are as multi-fold as conven-
tional regulation. Possible examples and case studies come from different sectors 
and countries. 
3.2 Chances and risks of the instrument 
During the last decades, environmental problems have changed. The example of 
climate change shows that they are highly complex. Other issues, like the 
damages of many forests (the “Waldsterben”), have shown to be persistent, which 
means that political attempts to solve them have failed or not shown the intended 
effects (Jänicke, Jörgens 2003). These complex and persisting problems set limits 
to traditional regulation and end-of-pipe-technologies and challenge environ-
mental governance. They have to be tackled by encompassing strategies, as inter-
dependences with other areas, e.g. the economy occurs very often. In this context, 
new forms of governance, such as voluntary agreements can be a chance. How-
ever, some risks related to this form of governance have to be considered as well.2 
Chances of voluntary agreements 
Voluntary agreements help to find an access to environmental problems which are 
complex and hence not easily to tackle via regulation. Especially in the case of 
complex environmental problems that involve many actors, it can be useful to 
design a voluntary agreement. In this agreement, the public authority and industry 
can exchange their knowledge according to the problem and can jointly develop 
policies adjusted to the complex environmental problem. The voluntary agreement 
can build on business’s particular knowledge of its own capacity to address 
environmental problems and respond to particular requirements of the local level 
                                                2	  	   For	  an	  overview	  see	  De	  Clercq/	  Suck	  2003:	  12	  f.	  and	  ten	  Brink	  2002:	  16	  f.	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(and hence bridge the gap between national legislation and local needs) (ten Brink 
2002: 16).  
Another positive argument is the high flexibility in the implementation of 
voluntary agreements and hence cost-efficiency for firms in realising the environ-
mental targets agreed upon. The OECD (2003: 14) believes that voluntary 
agreements are more cost-efficient than command-and-control regulation3. An 
agreement will be the more cost-efficient the more flexibility it gives to 
implementation so that abatement can be carried out in the companies or plants 
where the abatement costs are significantly low. It depends on the design of the 
voluntary agreement whether enough flexibility is granted to firms (Börkey et al. 
2000: 72).  
Furthermore, there are a lot of soft effects, which can be attributed to voluntary 
agreements: E.g. they foster the dissemination of information between partici-
pating firms. As the agreement would demand the participating firms to tackle a 
specific environmental target they would exchange information on environ-
mentally sound technologies in order to better reach the agreement. This exchange 
would not have taken place in case of the absence of an agreement. That is why 
innovation is encouraged through cooperation between firms. In this context, 
some authors have examined the potential of organisational learning within volun-
tary agreements (Ramesohl, Kristof 2002).  
Another soft effect is the opportunity to create environmental consciousness 
within firms and a greater appreciation of environmental issues in industry. As a 
consequence of the voluntary agreement, firms have to tackle environmental 
damage voluntarily within their own possibilities. They can realize that environ-
mental protection is not only connected with additional costs (as it is often the 
case with environmental regulation), but can also have benefits: they can improve 
their environmental image vis-à-vis the public and hence increase their sales to 
green consumers. Moreover, a firm can save inputs as pollution abatement may 
lead to a better use of resources (Börkey 2000: 16). Energy saving is a typical 
example: if a firm uses less energy, it can save money and protect the environ-
ment at the same time. This is called no-regrets-action or win-win-situation. Prior 
to the agreement, information on the use of clean technology or other energy 
saving methods would not have spread among the firms.  
                                                3	  	   According	   to	   a	   study	   of	   the	   OECD	   in	   2003,	   the	   economic	   efficiency	   of	   voluntary	   agreements	   has	  generally	  turned	  out	  lower	  than	  expected,	  as	  abatement	  targets	  are	  set	  at	  the	  sectoral	  and	  not	  at	  the	  national	  level	  which	  means	  that	  flexibility	  is	  not	  sufficient.	  But	  compared	  to	  command-­‐and-­‐control-­‐regulation,	  it	  is	  higher	  providing	  at	  least	  some	  flexibility	  in	  how	  the	  environmental	  improvements	  are	  to	  be	  accomplished	  (OECD	  2003:	  14).	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Risks of voluntary agreements 
The biggest concern with voluntary agreements is called regulatory capture. In 
some cases there is a strong incentive for industry to influence the outcome of 
voluntary agreement in its own interest. If it succeeds, it leads to weak measures. 
Börkey et al. (2000: 19) give a definition of this phenomenon: “A voluntary 
approach will be considered as being captured by industry when the environ-
mental target set is no more than the abatement associated with a business-as-
usual pattern.” When the environmental objective of the voluntary approach is 
close to the business-as-usual scenario this can be called regulatory capture. The 
consequences of regulatory capture may be poor environmental performance of 
the agreement.4  
One aspect is the link to information. If the voluntary agreement shall be effec-
tive, the government will have to collect information about the environmental 
problem, about abatement strategies and about costs evolving for industry. It is 
dependent on industry, which can provide necessary information about e.g. the 
feasibility of certain abatement strategies. Companies tend to act in a selfish 
manner, which means that they tend to underestimate the consequences of pollu-
tion and to overestimate the abatement costs in order to save resources.  
Another issue is the question of legitimacy: In most of the cases, voluntary 
agreements are negotiated between public authorities and industry. Third parties 
like NGOs, Parliaments, local communities or research institutes are usually not 
involved in the negotiation process. Without participation, the voluntary agree-
ment runs the risk of being captured. The different stakeholders could function as 
a kind of “watchdog” and ensure that ambitious targets are set in the agreement. 
Such a lack of transparency in case of nonexisting participation of third parties 
can lead to criticism by the public and the credibility of the agreement can be 
undermined.  
Another risk is to encourage free riding. It occurs when one or more parties to the 
agreement refrain from taking action agreed upon in the agreement. These firms 
can take advantage of the commercial benefits arising from doing nothing whilst 
the other participating firms are facing economic costs in taking action in order to 
achieve the targets set down by the voluntary agreement (EEA 1997: 43). This 
kind of behaviour especially occurs when a high number of participating compa-
nies and collective compliance (instead of individual compliance) is included so 
that non-compliance of single firms is not easily detected. 
                                                4	  	   A	  more	  general	  problem	  –	  in-­‐built	  in	  the	  design	  of	  negotiations	  between	  government	  and	  industry	  actors	   –	   exists	   in	   the	   case	   if	   the	   public	   authority	   itself	  would	   not	   have	   strong	   interests	   in	   tough	  environmental	  solutions	  but	  want	  to	  moderate	  public	  concerns.	  The	  public	  authority	  could	  initiate	  a	  voluntary	  agreement	  to	  circumvent	  other	  action	  and	  stop	  discussion.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  agreement	  could	  be	  easily	   captured	  by	   industry,	   as	  government	  would	  not	  have	  any	   interest	   in	  a	   too	  strong	  agreement.	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The cost-effectiveness of agreements is often ambivalent. Usually, it is assumed 
that voluntary agreements have low transaction and administration costs. But if 
too many partners take part in the negotiations, it becomes more difficult to reach 
an agreement. In this case the transaction costs increase because it takes more 
time to collect all the relevant information and to agree on a common position. 
Some negotiations have turned out as lengthy and troublesome and have slowed 
down the process of policy making. In addition, monitoring can turn out quite 
costly as well.  
Therefore, it is important to examine possible chances and risks of a voluntary 
agreement in advance and to develop the design of the agreement carefully. 
3.3 The use of voluntary agreements in the EU 
The use of voluntary agreements varies considerably. Therefore, an overview 
about the practice in the European Union and its member states is given. The aim 
is to provide some patterns concerning the geographical location, the economic 
sector as well as the environmental issue affected.  
Since a study of 1996 (European Commission 1997a, 1997b) no systematic data-
collection was carried out. Review chapter in other studies are all based on the 
1996 data. As most of the member states as well as the European Commission do 
not have an inventory of voluntary agreements, no current information about the 
geographical and sectoral distribution is available. Nevertheless, an internet 
investigation as well as contacts with ministries and industry associations 
provided additional data about recent trends and developments. 
3.3.1 Brief chronology 
Since the beginning of the 1990s the use of voluntary agreements has become 
more common in almost every member state of the European Union. A huge 
proliferation of voluntary agreements with a number of 305 at the national level 
(up to 1996) has been taken place5. The total amount of voluntary agreements in 
1995 nearly equals the sum of voluntary agreements issued between 1986 and 
1990 (DeClercq 2001). Over the past eight years, it is supposed that there are a lot 
of agreements to be added to. After 1996, the year of European wide inventory of 
voluntary agreements realised by the European Commission, Germany for 
example concluded round about 37 additional agreements until 2003 (BDI 2003).  
                                                5	  	   All	  data	  on	  the	  number	  of	  agreements	  (in	  all	  EU	  member	  countries)	  used	  in	  the	  existing	  study	  refers	  to	   the	   inventory	   from	   the	   European	   Commission	   in	   1996	   (EC	   1997).	   But	   even	   this	   information	  shows	   some	   problems	   as	   the	   criteria	   for	   definition	   as	   voluntary	   agreement	   as	   well	   as	   the	  information	  base	   is	   sometimes	  problematically.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  number	  gives	   a	   good	   insight	   in	  the	  development	  of	  this	  approach.	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Figure 3: Distribution of voluntary agreements in the EU-15 in 1996 
25
8
16
2
8
93
0 1
107
6
2
911
5
10
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Au
str
ia
Be
lgiu
m
De
nm
ark
Fin
lan
d 
Fra
nce
Ge
rm
any
Gre
ece
 
Ire
lan
d
Ita
ly
Lux
em
bo
urg
Ne
the
rlan
ds
Por
tug
al
Sp
ain
Sw
ede
n 
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m
Nu
m
be
rs
 o
f 
vo
lun
ta
ry
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 
n = 305 
Source: European Commission 1997  
Germany and the Netherlands account for two thirds of the concluded agreements. 
While voluntary agreements in the Netherlands represent the “independent type”, 
i.e. fully replacing other policies, the German agreements belong (like most 
agreements in the rest of the EU) to the “supporting or transition type” (see 
chapter 3.1). 
The first voluntary agreements were implemented in France (1971) and the United 
Kingdom (1972). Whatsoever, the 1970s could not be labelled as the decade of 
voluntary agreements but most of the European countries detected voluntary 
agreements as a useful tool for environmental policy in the 1980s. The majority of 
the European states introduced this approach on several administrative levels: the 
national, the regional as well as the local one.  
3.3.2 Distribution among sectors and policy issues 
Voluntary agreements establish targets for specific products, for production 
processes or for other processes such as recovery and recycling. They could be 
categorized according to their legal status: Apart from the Netherlands where 90 
percent of the agreements are legally binding, in the other member countries non-
binding agreements are the dominant form. Furthermore, the use of voluntary 
agreements varies from country to country and from sector to sector. But the 
instrument is not limited to these categories: There are multi-sector agreements 
and multi-issue agreements. Some of these patterns will be described in more 
detail. 
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The voluntary agreements concluded in the EU member states are related to 
different sectors. The industry and the energy sector are the most important ones; 
agriculture and tourism are less important. On closer examination within the sec-
tors, it is to observe that almost one third of all agreements in the European Union 
are concluded in the chemical industry, followed by the manufacture of food 
products, accounting for twelve percent. 
All European states get involved with measures that contribute to the abatement of 
industrial pollution. But also the energy sector is a field of great interest 
concerning the implementation of environmental voluntary approaches: Eight of 
15 member states, i.e. more than 50 percent, have concluded agreements in this 
sector (EEA 1997).  
Waste management, air pollution, climate change, water pollution, ozone deple-
tion and soil contamination are the most important environmental issues for 
voluntary agreements in the European Union: Waste management is subject to 
voluntary agreements in nearly every country of the European Union. This policy 
field owes its Europe-wide attention the great technological uncertainty that pre-
vailed when these problems were first addressed. The governments were unsure 
how to meet these challenges and needed close cooperation with the industry to 
develop realistic goals. Also in case of choosing the total number of voluntary 
agreements as reference level, waste management (ca. 82) and climate protection 
(ca. 77) are the most important policy fields. Agreements on pollution abatement 
emerge in the categories air, water and soil and mount up to ca. 70 in number 
(EEA 1997). Furthermore, a couple of voluntary agreements are related to a range 
of issues, even if they account for a smaller number (DeClercq 2001). 
3.3.3 Trends of development 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 1990s were a boom period for voluntary 
agreements as the number increased significantly during this time. Many studies 
and projects have been conducted at the end of the 1990s and have shed light on 
the development of voluntary agreements at that time (European Commission 
1997a, 1997b,). One part of these voluntary agreements continued to exist until 
the beginning of 2000 or beyond and others have been further developed. 
Furthermore, new voluntary agreements have been set up since then, which differ 
from the traditional voluntary agreements from the end of the 1980s and begin-
ning of the 1990s.  
The voluntary agreements or commitments during the 1980s and early 1990s were 
mainly concerned with the topics of pollution abatement or phase-out of 
dangerous substances. Examples for this type are the agreements to reduce SO2 
and NOX emissions in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium in order to limit the 
environmental problem of acidification. Another example for more traditional 
voluntary agreements are agreements concerning the problem of waste and recyc-
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ling such as the separate collecting of batteries (Belgium) or the recycling of end-
of-life vehicles (France and Germany) which were concluded in the mid-1990s.  
Today, the content of many voluntary agreements has changed. Very often, they 
are more concerned with qualitative goals. This can be demonstrated with the 
Long Term Agreements on energy efficiency in the Netherlands. The first phase 
of Long Term Agreements (1990–2000) set quantitative targets for energy effi-
ciency whereas the second phase for Long Term Agreements (2000-2010) puts a 
focus on qualitative targets as the development of energy management, energy 
efficient product development and renewable energy (Nuijen; Booij 2002). For 
energy efficient industries, a totally new approach has been developed: the 
benchmarking covenant on energy efficiency (see case study in chapter 4.2).  
In Germany, a shift from phase-out and reduction agreements to more complex 
agreements has taken place. Examples are the environmental pacts that have been 
concluded at the federal state level and which aim very often at the implemen-
tation of environmental management schemes as EMAS or ISO 14001 (BDI 
2003).  
An environmental problem that demonstrates the development of voluntary 
agreements is the issue of climate change. From the early to the mid 1990s, 
unilateral commitments such as the commitment by the German automotive 
industry to reduce fuel consumption of cars by 25 percent (1990) or the German 
declaration of industry on global warming prevention (1995) prevailed. They 
partly continue to exist as the former has being updated in 1995 and the latter has 
been updated twice in 1996 and 2000. Besides the Dutch and the German 
declaration further examples of the subject climate change are the British climate 
change agreements and the Austrian Kyoto Cooperation and Initiative for Climate 
Policy (see Ökobüro 2004).  
These examples show that voluntary agreements are still an important policy 
option in the field of climate change. The context of international climate policy 
and the legally binding targets on CO2 emission for each EU member state were a 
strong driver for that. However, the new instrument of EU-wide emission trading 
will probably have effects on these voluntary agreements, as it obliges industry to 
reduce CO2 emissions; at least if it does not want to pay for CO2 allowances in the 
future. In Germany, emission trading will probably become more important than 
the industry’s commitment and will replace it to certain extents. In contrast to 
that, in the Netherlands, emission trading is a supplement to the voluntary bench-
marking covenant on energy efficiency (s. chapter 4.2) and serves as a framing 
option.  
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To date, a rather limited number of agreements have been concluded at the Euro-
pean level. Most of them also deal with climate change. Examples are the ACEA-
agreement (European Automobile Manufacturers Association) focussing on the 
reduction of CO2 emissions from passenger cars released in 2002 and EACEM-
agreement on Reduction of Standby Power for televisions and video recorders 
(1997) dealing with the reduction of energy consumption of these products.  
Already in its Fifth Environmental Action Programme (5th EAP) from 1992 the 
European Commission has called for a broad mix of instruments to be applied in 
environmental policy. Voluntary environmental agreements explicitly comple-
ment this mix. In 1996, the European Commission published a first communi-
cation on the issue of environmental agreements (EC 1996). Subjects of the first 
impartation were of textual nature and about how to implement guidelines through 
environmental agreements in the member states. In the context of the action plan 
“Simplifying and Improving the Regulatory Environment” a follow-up communi-
cation on environmental agreements from 2002 deals with the question how to use 
environmental agreements on the community level (EC 2002). Thereby, this 
communication puts a focus on a future framework. Furthermore, several environ-
mental issues are identified for the development of voluntary agreements: PVC, 
Integrated Product Policy, waste management and climate change. Besides 
unilateral commitments, the Commission would also like to push voluntary agree-
ments as a means of implementation in the framework of legal acts (co-
regulation).  
Generally speaking, voluntary agreements in Europe develop further on. Not only 
in the “old” member states, but also in the states that joined the EU in spring 2004 
voluntary agreements have been already adopted. For laundry detergents, agree-
ments in Poland and the Czech Republic (see chapter 4) have been conducted. 
However, these countries still have to adopt a high number of EU regulations and 
directives.  
More and more directives in the European Union take the form of framework 
directives that leave more room for implementation. There are already some 
examples (e.g. in waste and packaging sector) that voluntary agreements can serve 
for implementation of European directives. If this trend is going on, voluntary 
agreements will evolve towards an element of co-regulation. That means that laws 
and agreements concerning the same issue are developed side-by-side in order to 
benefit from both of the advantages. A recent example for such a scheme is the 
German nuclear-power phase-out process. Thereby, a regulation describing the 
time horizon and the intermediate targets is accompanied by a voluntary commit-
ment of the electricity producing industry to phase out their power plants step by 
step with certain flexibility.  
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4 Case studies: Evaluation of European 
experiences 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, the range of experiences in Europe is quite 
large. Between the two poles of entirely voluntary commitments and conventional 
regulation, a variety of problems are addressed in a variety of negotiated commit-
ments and agreements between public and private actors. Examples and case 
studies come from different sectors and countries. In addition, the object of the 
agreement can be the design of products as well as the production process. The 
environmental issue addressed varies considerably. Thus, voluntary agreements in 
the European Union are as multi-fold as other policies as well. 
To give a more detailed picture of the structure and processes of voluntary 
environmental agreements, four different case studies are presented in the 
following paragraphs. Within these examples, the focus of analysis lays on 
success factors. Thereby, learning is possible on successful as well as on failed 
examples. However, to present good practice offers a much more constructive 
approach to show and prescribe how voluntary agreements work successfully. 
Thus, relatively successful examples are chosen, but the risks and less positive 
aspects are reflected, too. At the end of the chapter a comparative analysis pro-
vides success factors and a general conclusion regarding the context. 
4.1 Methodology 
The selection of cases is a challenging task. Hence, concrete selection criteria 
must be developed. Along these criteria a screening of several cases is necessary. 
This study is focusing on relatively successful agreements. Thereby, it has to be 
taken into account that a selection of the “best” examples is rather difficult. 
Defining success highly depends on the perspective, because conflicting political 
objectives have to be considered. In addition, the variety of policy issues does not 
allow a ranking of cases. As a consequence, this study is presenting exemplary 
cases that cover a range of possible areas. Thereby, the aspect of transferability to 
the Chinese situation is taken into consideration. 
4.1.1 Selection of cases 
To choose successful and interesting cases, it is necessary to take a closer look at 
European experiences. Because of the high number of voluntary agreements and 
commitments as well as the heterogeneous field, the collection of information 
about possible case studies is important. However, not only appropriate infor-
mation, but also criteria to structure and assess the collected information are 
needed as well.  
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Selection criteria 
Three principles are crucial for defining selection criteria:  
1. Firstly, the cases should represent good practices in order to show the benefits 
and crucial aspects within the field of voluntary agreements. Thereby, the la-
bel “successful” does not only concern the environmental outcome, but the 
procedures and the conditions leading to the positive appraisal, too.  
2. Secondly, the aim of the project to transfer experiences and develop a model 
for China and the City of Nanjing must be acknowledged. Hence, it is 
necessary to provide a range of examples concerning several characteristics of 
voluntary agreements. 
3. Thirdly, the recent most vital environmental problems in China have to taken 
into account. Therefore, not only complex problems like climate change but 
also pollution abatement and hazardous substances are of interest. In Europe, 
these kinds of problems were mostly discussed in the 1970s and 1980s, even if 
some of them are still on the agenda. Thus, “old” examples are also relevant.  
The first group of criteria regard the definition as “successful”. Thus, the 
“performance-oriented criteria” are based on a variety of aspects derived from 
literature (e.g. EEA 1997, EC 1996). To identify a good performance, the follow-
ing points are crucial:6 
• Improvement of the environment 
• Occasion of soft effects 
• Existence of quantified and ambitious targets 
• Existence of a monitoring system 
• Compliance-supporting framing (like integration in a policy mix) 
• Cost-effectiveness 
• Legitimacy of agreed objectives 
In addition to these performance-oriented criteria, the documentation of a wide 
range with several relations to the Chinese situation is necessary. Therefore, 
“additional selection criteria” include: 
• An appropriate range between the poles self-regulation and regulation (see 
chap. 3); 
• A variety of product- as well as process-related agreements;  
• A range of environmental issues; 
• A range in the sectoral distribution; and 
• A range of different contexts. 
                                                6	  	   A	   detailed	   description	   of	   the	   aspects	   is	   given	   in	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	   evaluation	   criteria	  (presented	  below	  in	  chapter	  4.1.2).	  Evaluation	  criteria	  are	  designed	  to	  identify	  a	  good	  performance.	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Selection procedure 
Due to the variety of different aspects, the choice of cases constitutes a complex 
task. To come to a reasonable selection, a logical step-by-step method was 
developed (see Figure 4). The selection-process is divided in four steps: 
1. A first enquiry in European Union member states provides a long-list with 
agreements. Therein, the title, the sector, the time horizon and additional 
aspects are depicted. 
2. A second investigation in the Internet and scientific publications - on cases 
selected from the first enquiry – provides a short-list containing agreements 
for which further and more detailed information is available. As for the selec-
tion, no comprehensive gathering of additional information, e.g. with inter-
views, was foreseen, this step must have been based on a literature review. 
3. The third step is the screening concerning the seven performance-oriented 
criteria (see chapter 4.1.2). To reduce complexity, only cases representing 
good practice in at least three features were chosen. Thus, a variety of cases 
and a list with relative successful agreement were given.  
4. Based on the good practice list, the choice of cases was possible. Thereby, the 
remaining “additional selection criteria” were used. 
Figure 4: Case study selection procedure 
 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
Rationale of selected cases 
After the preliminary evaluation, the choice of the cases was based on the 
additional selection criteria. The task was to find a range of cases that could 
enable learning and give a picture of different possible forms voluntary agreement 
could take. Under this condition, the decision for one particular case influences 
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the conditions for the choice of the others. Thus, the selection was inter-related 
and iterative. The final choice resulted in: 
• The Dutch Long Term Agreements on energy efficiency and the benchmarking 
covenant;  
• The ACEA-agreement between the European Automobile Manufacturers 
Association (ACEA) and the European Commission on the reduction of CO2 
emissions from the European car-fleet; 
• The Czech agreement on gradual reduction of impact of laundry detergents on 
the environment; 
• The German commitment on phasing out of polybrominated diphenylethers 
(PBDE) as flame retardant in synthetic materials. 
Starting point was the decision for a Dutch agreement scheme related to the 
system of Long Term Agreements and in the follow up “benchmarking covenants 
on energy efficiency”. As specific case, the sector of breweries was chosen. The 
LTA is among the most elaborated agreement schemes in Europe and the bench-
marking covenant represents the latest invention of pushing Dutch companies to 
become “the best in the world” in energy efficiency. Especially the strong relation 
to framing an agreement by other policy-instruments can only be observed in very 
few other cases in Europe.  
The ACEA-agreement was chosen because of the good performance in targets, 
monitoring and effects. Like the Dutch case, it is also related to energy efficiency. 
But there are two crucial differences: Firstly, it is a product-related agreement and 
secondly, it consists of two parts, which are a negotiated commitment and an 
official response in form of a communication of the Commission. 
Due to the focus to energy efficiency (and hence the environmental issue of 
climate change) of the first two cases, the other two examples are chosen from the 
field of pollution abatement. Concerning this topic, the chemical sector is one of 
the most important areas for voluntary approaches. Within the sector, agreements 
concerning emission reduction or phase-out of harmful substances could be seen 
as having a high relevance for the Chinese situation. Again it is differentiated 
between a product and a process-related agreement. 
The third case is like the ACEA-agreement dealing with a product-related volun-
tary environmental agreement, the reduction of phosphates in laundry detergents. 
Regarding the environmental effects, the agreement was supposed to contribute to 
a significant change in water pollution in the Czech Republic. This case is chosen 
not only because of the good practice in effects, monitoring costs and legitimacy, 
but also due to a possible transferability to China and the importance of the 
chemical sector for voluntary environmental agreements.  
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The German commitment on phasing out of polybrominated diphenylethers 
(PBDE) as flame retardants in synthetic materials is dealing with production 
processes. Even if it is an earlier example, it demonstrates a more self-regulated 
(German-style) way of addressing an environmental problem. It is located in the 
plastic-producing industry that has many connections to the chemical sector. 
Generally speaking, the selection presents a good overview concerning different 
fields as well as different approaches (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Characteristics of selected case-studies related to additional selection criteria 
Additional  
selection criteria 
Dutch LTA / 
benchmarking 
covenant 
ACEA-
agreement 
Czech agreement 
on phosphates in 
detergents 
German phase-
out agreement on 
PBDE as flame 
retardant 
Variety of product- 
as well as process-
related agreements  
Process-related Product- 
related 
Product- 
related 
Process- 
related 
Range of 
environmental 
issues 
Climate change Climate  
change 
Pollution 
abatement 
Pollution 
abatement 
Range in the 
sectoral distribution 
All sectors  
(food industry) 
Transport 
(manufacturing) 
Chemical and 
detergent industry 
Chemical and 
plastic producing 
industry 
Appropriate range 
between self-
regulation and 
regulation 
Agreement with 
strong framing 
Negotiated and 
agreed  
commitment 
Agreement 
resulting in 
contract 
Negotiated and 
agreed 
commitment 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
4.1.2 Methodology for evaluation 
Starting point for the definition of criteria that allow a structured evaluation of 
voluntary agreements can be the communications of the European Commission 
prepared in 1996 and updated in 2002. These non-binding texts are based on 
research projects concerning the use of voluntary agreements as well as on prac-
tical experiences gathered so far. In addition, several other studies were screened 
(e.g. EEA 1997, OECD 1999, Krarup/ Ramesohl 2000, ten Brink 2002)). 
Seven core-aspects represent the variety of arguments and recommendations in 
literature: 
• Environmental effects (measurable improvements of the environment); 
• Soft effects (awareness, learning and innovation pressure); 
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• Targets (specific definition of objectives to be reached); 
• Monitoring (evaluation and control of results); 
• Framing (incentives and sanctions as well as integration in a policy mix); 
• Costs (related costs); and 
• Legitimacy (democratic procedures and politically agreed objectives). 
Similar categories were used in the selection process. However, these core-
elements are very heterogeneous. Different levels and aspects are incorporated, as 
targets are a precondition to gain environmental effects. There are only very few 
attempts to find a more appropriate framework (e.g. DeClerq 2002). Evaluation 
criteria gather ultimate, instrumental and soft objectives that are partly related to 
requirements at the procedure and partly addressing social and political values. To 
find a solution, a more structured view could be useful. 
In political science (e.g. Mayntz, Scharpf 1995), the evaluation of policy instru-
ments is mainly based on two categories: problem solving capacity and 
legitimacy. In addition, economists refer to the cost-effectiveness of measures. 
These three evaluation dimensions are used in the case studies. However, the 
problem solving dimension is highlighted, as the environmental effectiveness is 
the focus of the research project.  
A voluntary agreement in the field of environmental policy has a high problem 
solving capacity if it contributes significantly to the improvement of the environ-
mental situation compared to the business-as-usual trend. Due to a lack of relevant 
information on environmental data and because the real impact of a policy 
measure on the environmental situation is very difficult to measure, it is assumed 
that three factors lead to positive environmental effects: ambitious targets, 
compliance with these targets and soft effects that promote policy learning and 
environmental awareness. The four selected case studies will be analysed towards 
these categories (see Table 2). 
Table 2:  Factors contributing to the success of a voluntary agreement 
Evaluation criteria Sub-aspects 
Problem solving 
capacity (Environmental 
effectiveness) 
Ambitious targets leading to an improvement of the environmental 
situation 
Compliance with agreed objectives 
Long term soft effects as policy learning and environmental awareness 
Legitimacy Broad acceptance in society 
Costs Cost-effectiveness of voluntary agreement 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
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4.2 Case study 1: The Long Term Agreements on  
energy efficiency and the benchmarking covenant 
(The Netherlands)  
The Dutch Long Term Agreements or “covenants” are a very comprehensive 
system of voluntary agreements that can be understood as a specific policy 
approach. It was developed in the beginning of the 1990s. Even if the approach 
was also applied to other problems like waste, the LTAs on energy efficiency are 
the most prominent example. These agreements are based on the will of the Dutch 
state to address the problem of climate change in cooperation with energy-inten-
sive industry. The most recent development is the so-called “benchmarking 
covenant” that can be seen as the second phase. This case study describes the 
Long Term Agreements and benchmarking approach in general and evaluates it at 
the example of breweries in particular. 
4.2.1 The first generation Long Term Agreements 
The Long Term Agreements on energy efficiency were signed at the beginning of 
the 1990s. They have become the major policy instrument for energy conservation 
and industrial CO2 emissions reductions. The goals for the Dutch climate policy 
are laid down in the National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP) from 1989 and 
1990. As only outputs and emissions or standards and procedures could be regu-
lated, a voluntary and learning oriented approach of Long-Term-Agreements was 
developed. It aimed at improvements in energy efficiency and was negotiated 
between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Confederation of Netherlands 
Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW). It resulted in the general goal to increase 
energy efficiency by 20 percent. Under this umbrella, sectoral agreements with 
different sector organisations were concluded. Finally, companies can join these 
branch covenants. Thus, the concrete agreements are part of an agreement scheme 
(see Figure 5). 
Most industrial sectors agreed to achieve an energy improvement of 20 percent 
until 2000 compared with 1989. Due to branch specific potentials the targets 
varied from sector to sector. 31 sector LTAs have been concluded covering about 
90 percent of the total industry energy consumption in the Netherlands. An 
intensive process management including monitoring, subsidy schemes, infor-
mation services and enforcement procedure supports the LTA programme. 
Individual companies joining the agreement had to prepare and implement an 
individual Energy Conservation Plan (ECP). Thus, there are not only global 
targets but also targets for individual firms.  
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Figure 5: The Dutch LTA agreement scheme 
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Each company had to decide, if they wanted to join the agreement. In the case of 
signing, they committed themselves not only to contributing to the targets but 
especially to performing certain measures like the setting up of an energy efficiency 
plan, delivering monitoring reports and participating in working groups. 
The Dutch energy agency, NOVEM (today: SenterNovem), as an independent 
third party, had the executive responsibility of the LTA programme. Before target 
setting, it carried out studies for potential increase of energy efficiency. During 
implementation, NOVEM was responsible for the monitoring, the control of the 
Energy Conservation Plans as well as several stimulating and facilitating tasks. 
An example for these activities was the set up of working groups in different sec-
tors where jointly measures were developed to increase energy efficiency in the 
respective sector. By the end of 2002, the energy efficiency improvement turned 
out at 22.3 percent (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6: Dutch LTA overall results (1989-2000) 
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Source: SenterNovem 2004 
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The voluntariness of the measures was chosen to involve actors more directly, 
raise their awareness and speed up action by avoiding long-lasting conflicts about 
regulatory measures. This is especially important, as the Dutch democracy is 
based on a consensus-seeking political culture. Nevertheless, the scheme was 
accompanied by incentives to participate and sanctions in the case of non-
compliance (carrots and sticks).  
4.2.2 The second generation: benchmarking covenant on 
energy efficiency 
After the year 2000, the approach was renewed and extended. The most important 
change is the broadening of the measures towards the whole production chain 
(e.g. transportation aspects) and the partial incorporation of renewable energy 
sources. The energy intensive sectors (> 5 PJ (Petajoules) energy consumption) 
joined the benchmarking covenant. It is designed to head further on towards 
energy efficiency and guarantee that Dutch companies (among them there are the 
breweries) belong to the ten percent of the most energy-efficient firms in the 
world. The participating companies will therefore have to make efforts to 
consume energy more efficiently without compromising their international 
competitiveness. However, they do not need to go further with measures than their 
best global competitors. 
The benchmarking approach is based on the first generation of LTA and included 
a lot of similar elements. It is an agreement scheme on association-level and 
individual companies can commit themselves to participate. Each sector sets up a 
benchmarking procedure and thus defines the target to be reached. Industrial 
enterprises do not only state that they will contribute to the agreed targets but 
allow monitoring the measures and oblige themselves to publish an annual Energy 
Efficiency Plan (EEP). 
The participating companies commit to undertake a leading global performance. 
In exchange for this, the Dutch government agrees to make a reciprocal effort. 
The government ensures that no supplementary national policy governing CO2 
reduction or energy conservation is imposed on the participating companies.  
The time horizon for the participating companies is 2012. A special feature of the 
covenant is the definition of targets as part of the agreement itself. The basic idea 
is that there are no prior-defined quantified targets (like in the LTA), other than 
the fact that production plants should belong to the 10 percent of the most energy-
efficient and best performing in the world (best-industrial standard). To make this 
abstract goal more tangible, the participating companies will have to set this level 
themselves by means of an international benchmark procedure. 
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With the help of an independent consultant and under observation of an 
appropriate authority (the Verifikatiebureau Benchmarking Energy-efficiency 
(Verification Bureau Energy/VBE)) industrial enterprises compare their 
processing plants in the Netherlands with similar plants abroad. The Dutch plants 
need to individually measure themselves against the average energy efficiency of 
the best region in the world or with the best ten percent of the globally structured 
installations (excluding those in the Netherlands)7. So, the companies that are 
above the standard only have to ensure to remain above the worlds lead. If they 
are below the standard, they have to develop measures to close the gap. Thus, the 
development of the standard is crucial for the definition of individual targets of 
the companies (in this case: the breweries). The standard must be redefined every 
four years. Thus, the targets mostly affect the laggards and not the forerunner and 
thus promote a least cost approach. 
Companies indicate in an energy efficiency plan that is updated every four years 
and supervised by the verification bureau, how and when the object should be 
reached. Thereby, the covenant contains criteria governing the rate of investment. 
Companies must begin by taking the most cost-effective measure (internal rate of 
return of 15 percent after tax), followed by measures that are less cost-effective. If 
they have not reached the world lead after having implemented these measures, 
they can also use flexible instruments such as trade in emission rights from 2008 
onwards. The independent verification bureau will evaluate the energy efficiency 
plan. Once it has been approved, it will be incorporated into the environmental 
license. This plan must be reviewed, when the benchmark is redefined. 
The implementation of the covenant is supervised. The Benchmarking Committee 
is responsible for overall implementation. This Committee consists of represen-
tatives of all the participating players. The Committee discusses a wide range of 
general bottlenecks, monitors the progress of the covenant and reports to the 
responsible ministries. The Benchmarking Verification Bureau has been specially 
established to monitor the practical aspects of the covenant. This independent 
bureau verifies for each company all different stages in the benchmark process. 
For example, the bureau checks whether the definition of the world lead is 
adequately underpinned and whether the energy efficiency plan has been properly 
put together. The bureau also issues advice on this to the participating company 
and to the competent authority. 
The agreement takes the form of a civil law contract and incorporates 25 Articles 
and five annexes. These articles can be grouped into six major elements.  
                                                7	   	  It	  will	  not	  be	  possible	  in	  every	  case	  to	  carry	  out	  this	  benchmark	  approach;	  e.g.	  if	  a	  unique	  process	  is	  involved	   or	   if	   the	   foreign	   plants	   do	   not	   want	   to	   take	   part	   in	   the	   analyses.	   In	   such	   cases,	   a	   best	  practice	  approach	  will	  be	  used	  to	  define	  the	  world	  lead.	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Table 3: Structure of the agreement 
Element Sub-aspects 
Targets Determination of the best industrial standard and the gap (Art. 4 
- 6) 
Consideration and measures Consideration (Art. 9 and 10),  
Energy Efficiency Plan (Art. 7) and  
Phasing (Art. 8) 
Monitoring Reporting (Art. 11 and 12)  
Evaluation (Art. 18) 
Framing (inbuilt incentives and 
sanctions) 
Benchmarking Commission and independent authority (Art. 13 
to 15)  
Withdrawal (Art. 21)  
Sanctions (Art. 22) 
Costs Costs (Art. 16) 
Formal aspects Definitions (Art. 1), objectives (Art. 2) and participants (Art. 3) 
and a list of signatories (Appendix 1), issues regarding confi-
dentiality (Art. 17), the time horizon (Art. 23) and the legal 
status (Art. 25) 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
 
The legal framework 
The first reference for the LTA and the benchmarking approach is the National 
Environmental Policy Plan. This defines the broad line of environmental policy in 
the Netherlands and states the goal of a substantial reduction of CO2 emissions. At 
the Kyoto Conference, the European Union as a whole agreed on a total reduction 
of eight percent. 
Both the LTA and the benchmarking system are linked to the permit system of the 
local authorities. Usually, it is the task of the local authorities to define for each 
company the environmental standards to be met according to environmental legis-
lation. If a company takes part in the benchmarking covenant, it is no longer 
subject to this permit system with respect to energy efficiency as this topic is 
covered by the covenant. If a company fails to fulfil its obligations under the 
covenant or even does not want to participate, it falls under the permit system 
again and has to fulfil the requirements on energy efficiency set by the local 
authority. That is a strong sanctioning mechanism as local authorities can set 
stricter targets for individual companies compared to the targets of the covenant. 
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Furthermore, the new instrument of emissions trading is linked to the bench-
marking. Companies participating in the covenant receive a fixed number of CO2 
allowances, whereas companies who do not participate have to negotiate with the 
local authorities. For companies that do not participate, the local authorities can 
assign fewer allowances. E.g. after not participating in the benchmarking, the 
local authorities reduced the CO2 allowances of two companies substantially (at 
15 percent). That was a strong and expensive target so that the two firms decided 
to join the benchmarking system afterwards. 
Table 4: Overview of the benchmarking of breweries 
Problem Climate change 
Objectives Make Dutch breweries more energy-efficient 
Make the participating brewers belong to the 10% most efficient in the world 
Actors Dutch Brewers’ Association (CBK) 
The Benchmarking Commission 
Verification Bureau Energy (as independent authority) 
Time 2000 to 2012  
Three periods: benchmarking and update of energy efficiency plans must car-
ried out every four years (2000, 2004 and 2008) 
Framework Benchmark covenant between the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and 
employers (VNO-NCW), sectoral business organisations and the Ministry for 
Economic Affairs as well as the Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment 
The National Environmental Protection Plan (NEPP) 
Future introduction of emission trading 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
 
Process (at the example of the benchmarking for breweries) 
After reaching strong improvement of energy efficiency in the first generation of 
LTA at the end of 2000, the Dutch government and the Dutch industry association 
(VNO-NCW) agreed on going further on this way and agreed in 1999 on the 
benchmarking covenant. In 2001 the large brewers decided to join. In a first step 
the brewery association Centraal Brouwerij Kantoor (CBK) was encouraged to 
organise the process of setting up a benchmark for this sector. Thus, a consultant 
(KWA Business Consultants) approved by the Verification Bureau developed a 
best industrial standard in industrial energy efficiency for the brewery sector. 
After sending a questionnaire to more than 500 breweries in the world and 
receiving 86 answers, the standard was defined at 193 MJ/hl (Megajoule/ 
hectolitre) Specific Energy Consumption (SEC) (Wouda, Pennartz 2002; Wouda 
2004).  
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Figure 7: The definition of the benchmark in case of the brewery sector  
in 2000 and 2004 
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Afterwards, the same consultant evaluated the participating companies of the 
respective sector and checked whether they were above or below the standard. In 
this way it was defined, which individual targets had to be achieved. Since the end 
of 2000, the breweries carried out measures. In addition, monitoring and a second 
benchmark process were started. The benchmark was carried out again in 2004. 
Like in 2000, approximately 500 breweries from all over the world were asked to 
participate in the benchmark; 158 breweries, representing 26 percent of the 
world’s beer production, took part. The best industrial standard was modified 
from 193 MJ/hl beer to 176 MJ/hl. The procedure of benchmarking, set up of 
energy efficiency plan, taking measures and monitoring will be carried out a third 
time. In the last phase, the companies can even reach their target by trading 
emission rights.  
4.2.3 Evaluation of success factors 
To learn from the Dutch case, the results of the LTA and the benchmarking for the 
brewery sector must be analysed more in detail. Thereby, it is referred to both 
LTA generations as a whole. 
Problem solving capacity 
The environmental effects are related to the performance of the companies as well 
as to economic growth. The Energy Efficiency Index (EEI) as well as, for the 
benchmarking of breweries, the Specific Energy Consumption (SEC) is relative 
and does not depend on economic growth. Even if the targets are reached, the total 
energy consumption, and thus the CO2 emission, can increase. That happened in 
the first generation LTA. In the case of the benchmarking of breweries, the SEC is 
related to the production unit of a hectolitre (hl) beer. Thus, efficiency gains could 
be compensated by growth and no substantial improvement for the environment 
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would be reached. At the moment, it is too early to evaluate the reduction of CO2 
emissions. For the breweries no information is available so far. 
An interim report from February 2002 states that several facilities were already 
under the top ten percent (Commissie Benchmarking 2002). However, the second 
benchmark carried out in 2004 and the decline of the SEC from 193 MJ/hl beer to 
176 MJ/hl leads to the conclusion that more efforts are necessary. 
However, estimations of the Utrecht University for the whole covenant and all 
participating industrial sectors show that a CO2 gain of 5.7 mega-tonnes can be 
expected. Related to the political goal of the Dutch government of 25 mega-
tonnes for the Netherlands and assuming an equal distribution of these reductions 
among all fields, the participating sectors should contribute with 13.5 mega-
tonnes (Glasbergen 2004). Related to that number, the expected results are not 
very promising.  
The targets of the benchmarking covenant on energy efficiency are not negotiated 
and defined in the agreement process. Instead, a soft and competition related 
objective “to belong among the ten percent most energy efficient firms in the 
world” was formulated. Hence, quantified targets are constructed individually for 
each plant and company and related to a periodically carried out benchmarking. 
This makes targets more flexible and supports allocation of measures. However, 
this approach leads to less transparency. 
The monitoring procedures of the benchmarking covenant are based on the 
experiences of the first generation LTA. The methodology is advanced and 
reporting is frequent. The verification bureau is supervising not only the bench-
marking but the achieved results as well. In the case of the breweries, the 
construction of specific energy consumption inside the benchmarking and the way 
to calculate it are accurate.  
The covenant is a legally binding civil law contract. The most relevant sanction in 
the benchmarking system is the monitoring itself. As a part of the auditing or 
monitoring mechanism, the verification bureau visits companies and can advise 
them to improve measures. An incentive for industry is the appeal to belong to the 
top ten percent. This label is not only a motivation to participate but also to meet 
the terms. An external factor for participation is the possibility of the provincial 
authorities to decrease the CO2 allowances in emission trading and the advantages 
for getting environmental permits from provincial environmental authorities. 
Regarding soft effects the first generation of LTA working groups supported 
learning effects and information exchange. The benchmarking approach is not 
related to these experiences. But the benchmarking process itself raises awareness, 
not only in the Netherlands but also in other parts of the world. The system of 
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benchmarking and the objective and label “to belong to the best” is not only a 
motivation to participate but to inform about solutions. Generally speaking, the 
LTA was more about finding new solutions, while the benchmarking is focussing 
on the diffusion of best practice in energy efficiency. 
Table 5: Problem solving capacity of LTA and benchmarking 
Description of case Success factors 
Ambitious targets  
Ambitiousness of targets varies from sector to sector 
but is based on studies of efficiency potential (LTA) 
Targets more than business-as-usual 
In the 2nd generation ambitiousness varies from 
facility to facility and company to company  
(benchmarking) 
But (!): Increase in CO2 emissions due to relatively 
high economic growth. 
Relate targets closely to political targets 
(e.g. Kyoto) 
Quantification of objectives is part of the job  
(benchmarking) 
Quantified objectives 
Intermediate target are related to measures (payback-
time of 5 years) 
Staged objectives 
Studies for potential of energy-efficiency were carried 
out (LTA) 
Carry out studies for technological 
potential of emission reduction 
Compliance mechanisms  
Frequent and fixed reporting procedure Reporting procedure 
Controlling by independent authority (Novem and 
Verification Bureau) 
Independent verification of results 
Incentive: appeal for industry to be among the best in 
the world  
Internal sanction: monitoring and possibility of  
abandoning 
External incentive: possibility for lower allowances in 
emission trading 
External compliance factors (integration 
in policy mix) 
Internal compliance factors included in 
the agreement 
Status as legally binding 
Soft effects  
Benchmarking and reporting mechanisms Promote dissemination of information 
Innovation pressure and information dissemination 
through working groups (LTA) 
Institutionalisation of environmental 
working groups and learning effects 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
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Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of the benchmark is approved by the participation of public 
administrations and reporting to the parliament. Monitoring reports are published 
ensuring that the public is informed. Due to confidentiality reasons, no firm 
specific data can be accessed. Despite that, NGOs or civil society were not incor-
porated. There is no data concerning the acceptance in society. 
Table 6: Legitimacy of LTA and benchmarking 
Description of case Success factors 
Information of the public in form of aggregated data  Information of the public and 
transparency 
Involvement of Environmental Ministry 
No NGOs participate 
Involvement of environmental interests 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
Costs 
The costs are shared between public and industrial actors. While the government 
pays for the staff of the verification office, industry has to pay the consultants and 
the measures carried out. There is no information, if costs are calculated in before-
hand. In relation to other agreements and commitments, the costs are higher due 
to independent supervision of benchmarking and reporting. But in relation to 
regulation, this cost does not seem to exceed regular monitoring costs. Companies 
pay the benchmarking itself, so that no costs for the public occur. 
4.2.4 Lessons to be learned 
In summary, the Dutch case is a rather successful example of European voluntary 
agreements. The comprehensive scheme and the extensive process management 
make it an example how the complex problem of climate change and energy 
efficiency can be addressed in a win-win constellation between industrial and 
environmental objectives. 
Generally speaking, the Dutch LTA and benchmarking covenant scheme represent 
a highly developed system of co-ordinated action for environmental industrial 
management and cleaner production. The case of breweries is only an example of 
how a sector is involved in the broader approach of setting up a general agreement 
scheme. The agreements are process related and trying to improve energy 
efficiency in most industrial sectors.  
While in the first generation LTA targets were sector-specific and negotiated, in 
the benchmarking the procedure itself leads to company specific objectives. Thus, 
the ambitiousness varies from facility to facility. A well structured monitoring 
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supported and controlled by an independent agency improves transparency and 
serves as a compliance factor. The framing and the integration in a policy mix are 
comprehensive. Incentives and sanctions are built in and push the companies to 
participate. Nevertheless, there is potential for improvement. It seems that a set up 
of working-groups like in the first generation LTA-scheme could have encouraged 
learning and information exchange. 
4.3 Case Study 2: ACEA-agreement on the reduction of 
CO2 from passenger cars (European Union) 
In 1998, a voluntary agreement has been concluded between the European Com-
mission and the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) 
dealing with the environmental problem of CO2 emissions from passenger cars. It 
aims at reducing CO2 emissions from passenger cars. Consequently, it is a product 
related agreement. Although the Commission has called for the increased use of 
flexible policy instruments and hence for voluntary agreements since the 
publishing of the 5th environmental programme of the EU in 1992, only a small 
number of agreements has been concluded at the European level. 
4.3.1 Description of the agreement 
CO2 emissions from the transport sector and especially from cars are an important 
environmental problem as they contribute significantly to climate change and are 
probably going to increase during the next years. Already at the beginning of the 
1990s, this problem was identified by European institutions.  
Box 1:  Transport and climate change 
The transport sector presents one of the greatest challenges for climate protection. In the 
EU, it is the fastest growing source of CO2 emissions. In absence of any policy measures, 
CO2 emissions from transport are predicted to rise almost 40% by 2010 compared to the 
level of 1990 and they will represent about 30% of European CO2 emissions. Emissions 
from passenger cars constitute about 50% of the EU’s transport-related CO2 emissions 
and represent 12% of the total EU CO2 emissions. The developments in the transport 
sector are a danger for the EU to reach its target committed under the Kyoto Protocol, 
which means a total reduction of CO2 emission of 8% below 1990 levels by 2008. All 
these figures show the importance of this environmental problem. 
Source: European Commission 1998, Singer, Volpi 2002 
Different legal proposals concerning the problem of CO2 emissions from cars (e.g. 
fiscal measures) were discussed from the beginning of the 1990s but no consensus 
between the EU member states could be reached. That is why European institu-
tions favoured a voluntary approach then. Therefore, a voluntary agreement was 
concluded between the European Commission and ACEA in 1998 after two years 
of negotiation.  
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The agreement takes the form of a commitment containing specified targets on the 
reduction of CO2 emissions from cars signed by ACEA in 19988, and a recom-
mendation signed by the European Commission in 19999. As negotiations 
between ACEA and the Commission have taken place, these two documents can 
be counted as an environmental voluntary agreement. European Parliament and 
the European governments (who are represented in the Council of the European 
Union — hereafter named the Council) are involved in so far as a Commission 
communication annually informs them about the progress of the agreement. They 
also decided on a supplement of the monitoring procedure in 2000 (“monitoring 
decision”). 
Members of ACEA are the European automobile manufacturers BMW, Porsche, 
Peugeot-Citroen, Daimler-Chrysler, Renault SA, Fiat, Scania, Ford, Volkswagen, 
General Motors, Volvo and MAN. The motive of the public authority, the Euro-
pean Commission, was to tackle the problem of CO2 emissions from cars. As it 
turned out that the problem could not be solved by legislation or fiscal measures 
due to the lack of consensus between the EU member states, a voluntary agree-
ment seemed to be a feasible solution. ACEA’s motive behind the commitment 
was to prevent legislation or fiscal measures on CO2 emissions from cars (e.g. a 
maximum standard for CO2 emissions or a purchase tax) in order keep flexibility 
and to leave room for different car models. The voluntary agreement with the 
target of 140g CO2/km represents more flexibility for the automotive industry than 
legal standards, as the target has to be reached for the average European car fleet 
and not by individual car companies or car models.  
The legal framework 
Voluntary Agreements at the EU level are legally not binding, as the Commission 
does not have a formal right to sign agreements with industry. That is why EU-
wide voluntary agreements have until now been self-commitments by industry, 
recognised by the European Commission by an exchange of letters or a Com-
mission Recommendation (ten Brink 2002).  
The Commission has adopted guidelines on voluntary environmental agreements 
already in 1996 (European Commission 1996). European Parliament and Council 
have repeatedly expressed their interest in framework legislation on environ-
mental agreements specifying how to deal with environmental agreements at the 
European level. In 2002, the Commission has published another communication 
on environmental agreements (European Commission 2002), in which the 
                                                8	  	   ACEA	  Commitment	  on	  CO2	  emissions	  reductions	  from	  new	  passenger	  cars	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  an	  environmental	  agreement	  between	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  ACEA,	  in:	  ACEA	  (2002).	  	  9	  	   Commission	   Recommendation	   of	   5	   February	   1999	   on	   the	   reduction	   of	   CO2	   emissions	   from	  passenger	   cars	   (1999/125/EC),	   in	   the	   Official	   Journal	   of	   the	   European	   Communities,	   L40,	   p.	   49,	  13.2.1999.	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Commission recognises this demand and suggests how to handle environmental 
agreements in the future.  
There is no legislative act in the area of CO2 emissions from passenger cars at the 
European level. But in 1996, the European governments have approved a strategy 
that is based on three policies: 
• A voluntary agreement with the automotive industry; 
• The promotion of car fuel efficiency by fiscal measures; and 
• A consumer fuel-economy labelling scheme of cars. 
In general, this strategy is linked to the EU’s target under the Kyoto Protocol (an 
eight percent reduction of CO2 emissions by 2008) and shall contribute to reach 
CO2 reductions in the transport sector. The Council conclusions specified the 
objective of the strategy: 120g CO2/km should be attained on average for newly 
registered passenger cars by 2005, latest by 2010. The Council also indicated that 
industry should contribute significantly to this target by an agreement. The 
ACEA-agreement is one part of the implementation of this strategy. Like all 
voluntary agreements at the European level, it is legally not binding and no 
enforcement mechanism is contained in the agreement. The only sanction is the 
fact that the Commission will propose a legislative act if the targets of the 
agreement are not met. This is stated in the Commission Recommendation.  
Table 7: Overview of ACEA-agreement on CO2 emissions reductions 
Problem CO2 emissions from passenger cars 
Objectives Reduction of CO2 emissions from passenger cars: 
Reducing the CO2 emissions of passenger cars to 140g CO2/km by 2008 
Achieving an intermediate CO2 emission target of 165-170g CO2 /km by 2003 
Placing passenger cars emitting 120g CO2/km or less on the market in the 
Community by the year 2000 
Actors Agreement parties: 
European Automobile Manufacturers Association with 12 members 
European Commission 
Parties taking part in the monitoring: 
European Parliament 
Council of the European Union 
Time 1998 to 2008 
Framework Community strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and improve 
fuel economy (1996) 
Communication of the Commission on Environmental Agreements at 
Community level (2002)  
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
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The agreement process 
The problem of CO2 emissions from passenger cars has been on the agenda since 
the beginning of the 1990s. The relevant actors of the national and European level 
tried to find solutions to tackle this problem.  
Already in 1991, an EU Directive10 required that the Council should decide on 
measures to limit CO2 emissions from passenger cars. The Commission was 
instructed to develop proposals on this issue. Different proposals from the EU 
member states emerged, on which no consensus could be reached (Keay-Bright 
2000: 18). 
As a consequence of the failure to draft a legislative proposal, European Com-
mission proposed the strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars in 
1995 in which the voluntary agreement with the automotive industry played an 
important role. The European governments approved the strategy in 1996.  
Negotiations between ACEA and the Commission on a voluntary agreement 
started in 1996 shortly after the strategy had been decided.11 ACEA was not very 
enthusiastic about an EU-wide agreement in the beginning because there were 
already some voluntary commitments in force at the national level (Germany, 
France, Sweden). But in order to prevent legislation in the transport sector, nego-
tiations were started then. The Commission tried to exert pressure on ACEA by 
presenting legal options concerning CO2 emissions of cars, but this was not 
always very successful, as ACEA knew how difficult it would be to reach 
consensus between the EU member states. After difficult and lengthy nego-
tiations, the agreement could finally be concluded in June 1998. One month later, 
ACEA presented its commitment (printed in ACEA 2002), and this was recog-
nised by the Commission by a Recommendation in February 1999 (European 
Commission 1999). As already mentioned, this agreement has a special legal form 
distinct from other negotiated agreements, as the European Commission is not 
allowed to sign agreements with industry.  
The implementation of the agreement has been carried out since it was concluded 
and recognised by the European Commission in 1999. From 2000 on, yearly joint 
monitoring reports from ACEA and the European Commission have been carried 
out, the first one analysing CO2 emission from cars from 1995 until 1999. In 2000, 
the monitoring procedure has been extended under the influence of the European 
Parliament and the Council: The Commission has to report annually on the 
progress of the agreement to the European Parliament and the Council via a 
communication and the EU member states are required to provide data on CO2 
                                                10	  	   Directive	  91/441/EEC	  11	  	   For	   a	   detailed	   description	   of	   the	   negotiations	   between	  ACEA	   and	   the	   European	  Commission,	   see	  Keay-­‐Bright	  2000:	  19-­‐26.	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emissions of cars. The fourth and most recent annual report has been published at 
the beginning of 2004 (for the reporting year 2002) and states that ACEA seems 
to be on a good way to achieve its commitments (European Commission 2004b). 
A “Major Review” has been announced by ACEA in the voluntary agreement for 
the year 2003 which shall evaluate the agreement, the development of CO2 
emission reductions until 2003 and the potential for further CO2 reduction with a 
view to move further towards the Community’s objective of 120g CO2/km by 
2012. Until now, the results of this review have not been published.  
4.3.2 Evaluation of success factors 
Problem solving capacity 
During the preparation of the agreement, ACEA carried out some technical 
studies on the possibilities of reducing CO2 emissions from cars. The Commission 
was not able to carry out technical studies itself due to a lack of time and infor-
mation and financial constraints as well.  
The aim of the agreement is to achieve an average reduction of CO2 emissions from 
new passenger cars of 25 percent by 2008 (compared to 1995). This corresponds to 
an average reduction from 186g CO2/km (in 1995) to 140g CO2/km in 2008. This 
reduction should be reached by technological developments affecting different car 
characteristics and market changes linked to this development.  
The targets of the agreement are quantified and have a fixed timetable. An inter-
mediate target exists as well (even though it is not very precise) so that it is 
possible to examine whether the automotive industry is on a good way to reach its 
achievements.  
The European Commission could have gone for a more ambitious target of 120g 
CO2/km, but it is questionable whether the agreement would have been concluded 
under these circumstances. 
Table 8: Targets of the ACEA-agreement 
Timeframe Target 
2000 Some members of ACEA will introduce cars emitting 120g CO2/km or less to 
be sold on the EU market 
2003 An interim target of 165-170g CO2/km for the average of EU new car sales 
(this corresponds with a 9-11% reduction of CO2 emissions compared to 1995) 
2008 A target of 140g CO2/km for the average of EU new car sales (this 
corresponds with a 25% reduction of CO2 emissions compared to 1995) 
Source: Wuppertal Institute based on ACEA (2002) 
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One crucial aspect of voluntary agreements in order to reach compliance is moni-
toring. In case of the ACEA-agreement, the monitoring process had not been 
defined in the initial agreement, but it has been improved during the implemen-
tation phase so that it could develop many strengths (ten Brink 2002: 446 f.). 
After the so-called “monitoring decision” made by the European Parliament and 
the Council in 2000, the monitoring reports are now communicated at a high 
political level by an annual Commission communication to the European 
Parliament and the Council. These data are also available in the Internet12. From 
2002 on, independent data have been available from the member states allowing 
an independent verification of the ACEA data. Furthermore a joint reporting 
format across the associations and electronic formats for data provision have been 
introduced. 
The ACEA-agreement is not legally binding and integrated in the community 
strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars. As other policy measures 
directly related to CO2 emissions from cars do not exist, no further incentive that 
could stimulate emission reductions is provided. The only sanctioning measure, 
also mentioned in the Commission Recommendation, is the threat that the Com-
mission is willing to propose a legislative act if ACEA fails to achieve the CO2 
emission target for 2008 or if ACEA does not make sufficient progress towards 
this objective. Keay-Bright points out that this threat has not been very strong 
because of the fact that a concrete proposal has not been developed and the threat 
has been thus relatively vague (Keay-Bright 2000). 
A development related to the agreement has been the increase of the share of 
diesel cars from 24 percent in 1995 to 43.6 percent in 2002 and a decrease of 
gasoline cars from 73.4 percent to 56.3 percent. Diesel cars emit less CO2. In 
2002, petrol-fuelled vehicles emitted 172g CO2/km whereas diesel-fuelled 
vehicles only emitted 155g CO2/km. Thus, ACEA could reduce CO2 emissions 
due to the development of “dieselisation”. The Commission points out in its 2004 
communication that “it was understood that the associations would not meet it 
[the target] by a simple increase in the diesel share only, but by technological 
developments and market changes linked to these developments” as well 
(European Commission 2004: 8)13. As a consequence of not too ambitious targets, 
this kind of innovation has only slowly taken place. Furthermore, the problem of 
particles in diesel motor emissions is a major problem as well. Thus, more 
comprehensive efforts are needed.  
                                                12	  	   Sources	  are	  listed	  in	  the	  section	  Links	  concerning	  the	  case	  studies.	  13	  	   The	  Commission	  also	  mentions	  negative	  environmental	  effects	  of	  diesel-­‐fuelled	  cars	  such	  as	  nano-­‐particulate	  emissions,	  which	  may	  affect	  human	  health	  and	  points	  out	  that	  probably	  limits	  for	  these	  particle	  emissions	  will	  be	  tightened	  in	  the	  future.	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There is no information available on whether learning processes and dissemi-
nation of information have taken place within ACEA. As the automotive sector is 
highly competitive, one can assume that companies tend to be careful in 
exchanging information on new technical innovations. But as the automobile 
manufacturers have committed themselves to reduce CO2 emissions from cars, 
awareness on this issue has very probably emerged among the manufacturers.  
The environmental situation has surely improved as the average emissions from 
new cars have decreased from initially 186g CO2/km to 166g CO2/km, and the 
automotive industry is on a good way to achieve its target until 2008. Never-
theless, the Commission stressed in its latest annual report on the strategy to 
reduce CO2 emissions from cars that additional efforts are necessary for the auto-
motive industries (European Commission 2004). CO2 emissions have decreased 
annually about 1.5 percent, although a reduction rate of two percent from 1995 to 
2008 would be necessary to meet the 140g target. Furthermore, it is unclear 
whether the actual decrease in CO2 emissions corresponds with a business-as-
usual trend.  
It is questionable whether the agreement will contribute sufficiently to obligations 
of the EU under the Kyoto-Protocol. The target of 140g CO2/km is probably not 
sufficient to stabilize CO2 emissions from passenger cars at 1999 level by 2010 
(Volpi/Singer 2002: 143) On the contrary, CO2 emissions in total will probably 
increase due to increased sales of cars in the EU. If the target of the agreement 
was more ambitious, more environmental effects (i.e. the stabilisation or reduction 
of CO2 emissions from passenger cars) could be reached.  
There are other aspects that could have been made better: Before setting a target, a 
feasibility study not only by industry but by the public authority as well would 
have provided more information on the ambitiousness of the target. According to 
an OECD study, a 50 to 80 percent improvement in fuel economy would be 
technically possible during the next ten to 15 years at little extra cost (Singer/ 
Volpi 2002: 149). A more ambitious target would have led to a stronger 
innovation pressure for the automobile industry. Furthermore, detailed provisions 
on the monitoring procedure, incentives and sanctions within the agreement text 
and a legally binding status could have further stimulated compliance.  
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Table 9: Problem solving capacity of ACEA-agreement 
Description of case Success factors 
Ambitious targets  
Target of 140g CO2/km for the average of EU new car 
sales by 2008 
Quantified objectives with clear time 
horizon 
Intermediate target of 165-170g CO2/km for the average 
of EU new car sales by 2003 
Intermediate target in order to evaluate 
whether industry is on a good way to 
achieve final targets 
Compliance mechanisms   
Joint monitoring by ACEA and the Commission, joint 
monitoring reports are published yearly on the Internet 
Public monitoring procedure 
Monitoring procedure has been improved by the 
“monitoring decision” providing independent data on 
CO2 emissions from cars from the member states 
Independent verification of industry data 
Joint reporting format used, use of electronic formats 
for data provision 
Facilitation of data comparison and 
evaluation 
Commission intends to introduce legislation if ACEA 
does not comply with the agreement 
External threat 
Soft effects  
Slow diffusion of new technologies such as direct 
injection engines 
Innovation pressure 
Awareness seems to have been promoted within ACEA Awareness rising 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
 
Legitimacy 
One major criticism on the ACEA-agreement is a lack of participation often 
pointed out by different stakeholder groups and European Institutions as well. 
Two important European Institutions — the European Parliament and the Council 
— as well as the civil society have not been involved in the negotiation process of 
the agreement. NGOs have also criticised that the public is not informed about the 
progress in CO2 emissions made by the individual members of ACEA as the target 
applies to the industry association in total.  
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Table 10: Legitimacy of the ACEA-agreement 
Description of case Success factors 
Joint monitoring reports by ACEA and Commission are 
communicated to the European Parliament and the 
Council via a Commission Communication  
Other institutions are involved in con-
trolling the implementation of the 
agreement: third party involvement 
Monitoring reports are published on the Internet Monitoring reports published in the 
internet creating transparency 
Information of the public 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
In order to increase the acceptance of the agreement by the civil society and hence 
to increase its legitimacy, the public could have been better involved in the 
negotiation process, e.g. by a multi-stakeholder dialogue.  
Costs 
No information on the costs of the ACEA-agreement has been available. But as 
accompanying policy measures do not exist and framing is less developed, it can 
be assumed that implementation costs are low. The monitoring procedure is an 
exception from this assumption. Not only do ACEA and the Commission carry 
out joint monitoring reports, but also independent data is collected from the 
member states. An expert group has been established and a study has been carried 
out to identify and solve potential problems arising from the monitoring decision, 
as the member state data are not completely comparable to ACEA data (European 
Commission 2004. 11). It can be assumed that this procedure is time consuming 
for the administrations of the member states and the Commission and, thus, con-
nected with a certain financial burden for the public authority.  
4.3.3 Lessons to be learned 
The ACEA-agreement has turned out to be effective concerning its performance 
and the monitoring procedure as well. Even if target achievement (compliance) 
seems to be rather successful, the targets could have been more ambitious. If CO2 
emissions are going to increase due to increased car sales in the EU in the future, 
targets will have to be set more ambitiously in a possible second round of the 
agreement if the EU wants to reach its commitments under the climate change 
regime. In such a case, it would be necessary that innovation processes have to 
take place faster than it has been the case until now. 
Even if there were no provisions regarding the monitoring procedure in the 
agreement text, monitoring has developed in a positive way. Criticism by the 
European Parliament, the Council and civil society led to a comprehensive 
monitoring procedure, e.g. the provision of independent emission data form the 
member states. Moreover, the fact that yearly monitoring reports are being 
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published in the Internet contributes to the transparency and credibility of the 
agreement.  
Besides the general threat of a legislative act by the Commission, further positive 
and negative sanctions — either within the agreement or by the integration in a 
policy mix — could have improved the effectiveness of the agreement.  
4.4 Case Study 3: Agreement on gradual reduction of 
impact of laundry detergents on the environment 
(Czech Republic) 
The third case study, taken from the Czech Republic, is dealing with a product-
related voluntary environmental agreement, the reduction of phosphates in 
laundry detergents. It provides a good example of how voluntary agreements can 
replace command-and-control regulation by more flexible action and also shows 
its danger. Replacing command-and-control regulation is possible especially 
because the target-sector — the detergent producers — consists of relatively few 
but big companies. Assuming a variety of small and medium sized companies, it 
would be very difficult to include and control firms similarly. Another interesting 
point is the fact that in some other (former western) European countries, like 
Germany14 and Austria, cleaner production in terms of lower quantity of phos-
phates in laundry detergents already existed. Thus, the case is more about inno-
vation transfer than stimulation of new solutions.  
Until 2004, on European level no single legislation regarding phosphates in 
laundry detergents exists15. Therefore the situation in the member states is 
fragmented and a variety of regulations allow very different levels of phosphates 
and different market shares of phosphate-free laundry detergents16. 
4.4.1 Description of the agreement 
Starting point for negotiations about an agreement in the Czech Republic were 
concerns about the negative impact of laundry detergents on the environment, 
especially on a quality of surface water (see Box 6). To reach the aim of 
decreasing the amount of phosphates polluting surface water, two main measures 
                                                14	   	  E.g.	   in	   Germany	   phosphates	   are	   nearly	   entirely	   banned	   from	   laundry	   detergents.	   Especially	  through	   the	   introduction	   of	   compact	   detergents	   the	   immission	   of	   phosphates	  was	   reduced	   from	  42,000	  tons	  in	  1975	  to	  2,000	  tons	  in	  1993.	  	  15	  	   In	   European	   regulations	   concerning	   consumer	   information	   through	   labelling,	   phosphates	   are	  limited	   but	   not	   generally	   excluded.	   E.g.	   laundry	   detergents	   are	   excluded	   form	   the	   eco-­‐label	   if	  phosphates	  exceed	  30	  g/washing.	  16	  	   In	  Switzerland	  all	  phosphates	  are	   forbidden.	   In	  Austria,	  Germany,	   Italy	  and	  Norway	   limits	   for	   the	  maximum	  proportion	  of	  phosphates	  exist	  as	  well	  as	  consumer	  information	  must	  be	  indicated	  on	  the	  packaging.	  This	  is	  common	  in	  other	  European	  countries,	  too,	  but	  no	  legally	  binding	  limits	  are	  given.	  In	   the	  new	  (eastern)	  European	  Union	  member	  states	  so	   far	  no	   legislative	   limits	  exist.	  Only	   in	   the	  Czech	  Republic	  and	  in	  Poland	  voluntary	  agreements	  are	  in	  force	  (FEA	  2003).	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should be taken: Firstly, it was intended to reduce the amount of phosphates in 
washing powders. Secondly, the share of compact detergent should be signifi-
cantly increased. The latter is an improvement, because compact detergents bring 
the same quality in cleaning without any phosphates included. In addition, con-
sumer information and biological degradability are incorporated, too.  
Box 2:  Environmental impact and role of phosphates The	  Czech	  agreement	  is	  designed	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  solution	  of	  water	  pollution	  issues,	  particularly	  eutrophication	  of	  surface	  water	  caused	  by	  phosphor	  and	  nitrogen.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  that,	  infestation	  of	  water	  plants	  (algae	  and	  phytoplankton)	  lead	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  oxygen-­‐level	  in	  water.	  Finally,	  this	  is	  followed	  by	  threats	  to	  water	  animals	  and	  negative	  impacts	  to	  fishing.	  	  Phosphates	  (mainly	  Pentanatriumtriphosphat)	  take	  a	  number	  of	  functions	  in	  detergents.	  Hardness-­‐builders	  of	  water	  are	  complexed	  and	  the	  optimal	  ph-­‐level	  for	  washing	  is	  assured.	  Further	  on,	  dirt-­‐particles	  are	  postponed	  so	  that	  the	  greying	  of	  textiles	  in	  the	  washing-­‐lye	  is	  held	  up.	  In	  phosphate-­‐free	  laundry	  detergents	  —	  e.g.	  the	  ones	  on	  the	  German	  market	  —	  three	  alternative	  substances	  fulfil	  those	  functions:	  Zeolith	  A,	  Soda	  und	  Polycarboxylat	  (PCA).	  Even	  in	  these	  substances,	  some	  environmental	  problems	  exist.	  E.g.	  PCA	  is	  not	  biodegradable. 
Source: Sauer 2001; FEA 2003 
The agreement, signed in 199517, takes the form of a civil law contract and incor-
porates eleven paragraphs. These paragraphs outline the main elements of the 
agreement. Besides some formal aspects regarding the agreement parties, the issue 
and possibilities to terminate the agreement, the paragraphs are related to three 
elements: Targets, monitoring and framing. Within this framework the main focus 
is laid on targets, while only some general statements represent monitoring and 
framing. 
                                                17	  	   After	   the	  agreement	  was	   set	  up,	   the	  public	  discourse	  about	  phosphates	   continuously	   returned	   to	  the	  agreement	  and	  lead	  to	  improvements	  and	  changes	  by	  the	  signing	  of	  supplements	  in	  1998	  and	  2001.	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Table 11: Structure of the Czech detergent agreement 
Element Sub-aspects 
Targets Quantified limits of detergent ingredients to be reached (§ 3); 
Surfactant biodegradability (§ 5); requirement of ingredients that 
fulfil the standards of the EU (water framework 2000/60/EC; 
surface water directive 1975/440/EC) 
Promotion of compact detergents (§ 4); 
Consumers’ information (§ 6) and labelling the non-phosphate 
detergents (2001) (§ 3b); 
Monitoring Joint evaluation of agreement’s fulfilment and observance of 
agreement’s principles (§ 7 and 8); 
Framing (inbuilt incentives 
and sanctions) 
Sanctions (§ 11); Sanctions for non-compliance are related to 
the threat of payments in the case of non-compliance (1.000.000 
CZK).  
Formal aspects Further Provisions (§ 9); Termination of Agreement (§ 10) 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
The contractors were the Ministry of the Environment and the Czech Soap and 
Detergent Products Association (CSDPA). On the side of the producers, the main 
motives were to show corporate responsibility and at the same time to limit nega-
tive impacts on business by a possible strict law. As a side effect, the formation of 
the CSDPA can be seen as a direct consequence of the will to come to a voluntary 
agreement with the Ministry. Member organisations of the association are five big 
companies covering more than 90 percent of the Czech detergent market: 
Unilever Czech Republic, Procter&Gamble Czech Republic, Henkel Czech 
Republic, Benckiser Czech Republic and Setuza). 
Other involved parties were two non-governmental organizations (NGOs) called 
“Rosa” and “Veronika” as well as the Chemical and Technology College in 
Prague as independent experts. They were not formally involved in the nego-
tiations but incorporated in monitoring (Sauer et al. 1999). 
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Table 12: Overview of the Czech detergent agreement 
Problem Phosphates polluting surface water 
Objectives Reduction of phosphates and other substances in surface water through: 
Reducing the share of phosphates in detergents to 5,5%; 
Promoting compact detergents; 
Informing the public; 
Actors Agreement parties: 
The Ministry of the Environment 
The Czech Soap and Detergent Products Association (5 biggest producers) 
In evaluation working group: 
2 NGOs and Chemical and Technology College in Prague 
Time 1995 to 2005 
Framework Prior to 1995 no other legislation in force, draft-law in 1993 
Sanction (since 2001): Payment of 1.000.000 CZK (≈ 33.000 Euro) 
EU-legislation will be in force from 2005 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
 
The legal framework 
The voluntary agreement is entirely replacing all kinds of regulation regarding the 
issue of phosphates in surface water18. As even in the EU no limits or bans exist, 
the agreement remains an important instrument and might be renewed in 2005. 
The agreement is formulated like a civil law contract between two parties 
(Industry association and Ministry of Environment). But as the Czech constitution 
does not allow public actors to act under civil law, the agreement is probably not 
formally binding (Sauer et al. 2001: 87). However, until now, no court had to 
decide about that open question.  
The agreement process 
The discourse about the environmental problem of phosphates and the way of 
formulating a voluntary agreement in the Czech Republic was not finished after 
signing the contract. This was only the first phase in an ongoing discourse about 
the solution of the environmental problem. In this process, the agreement was 
amended twice. The agreement-process can be roughly divided in four phases. 
The end of each phase is marked by a formally signed agreement or supplement 
that summarises the results of the discourse and concrete negotiations. 
                                                18	   	  In	   contrast	   to	   the	  Czech	  situation,	   in	  Germany,	   a	   regulation	   from	  1980	   (Phosphathöchstmengen-­‐verordnung)	  is	  added	  by	  additional	  voluntary	  commitments.	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The first phase enclosed the awareness of an environmental problem and the 
political decision to address this problem by the voluntary agreement governance 
approach. After a draft proposal of the ministry, industry pushed the idea of 
voluntary action and formed a producer’s association. In March 1995 it was 
finally agreed on a text between the detergent producers and the Ministry of 
Environment. In this first round, mainly the quantified targets were negotiated. 
Limits are quantified and separated in limits for normal detergents and so-called 
phosphate-free detergents. They are related to four to five components (see Table 
13). As no time frame existed prior to 2001, no intermediate objectives are given.  
Table 13: Quantified targets of the Czech detergent agreement 
 Phosphate detergents Phosphate-free detergents 
EDTA Max. 0.1 % Max. 0.1 % 
NTA Max. 4.0 % Max. 4.0 % 
Polycarboxylates Max. 6.0 % Max. 6.0 % 
Phosphorus in total Max. 5.5 % Max. 1.1 % 
Source:  Czech Voluntary Environmental Agreement 1995 
 
Since 1996 a working group has hold annual evaluation meetings and has written 
reports. Due to the ongoing discussions and the results of monitoring 1997/1998, 
the ban of adducts of alkyl-phenols with ethylene-oxide was discussed. The dis-
course finally led to the signing of a supplement to the agreement that introduced 
a new paragraph stating the phase-out of these substances. While the period until 
1998 was dominated by discussions about the targets, a third phase led to 
improvements in the pressure for compliance with the agreed objectives.  
In 2000, the ministry pressurized — by again bringing a command-and-control 
regulation on the legislative agenda — further amendments concerning labelling, 
a concrete time-horizon and sanctions for non-compliance to the agreement. In 
July 2001, an appendix to the agreement was signed announcing to meet the 
objectives by the year 2005. In addition, a measure for the case of non-compliance 
was taken in. In the case of non-compliance the producer’s association must pay a 
fee of 1,000,000 CZK (ca. 33,000 EUR). The forth phase is ongoing and should 
be finished by reaching the targets. Final evaluation is not yet carried out so that 
possible sanctions cannot be applied. 
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Table 14: Process of Czech detergent agreement 
1993  Preparation of a draft-law (limits to phosphates: 5,5% until 1997 / afterwards 
0,5%) 
1994  Set-up of an producers association and start of negotiations 
22.3.1995 First agreement  
Focus on targets 
Monitoring: annual	  meetings	  for	  evaluation 
1996 Establishing a working group for voluntary agreement implementation 
evaluation (Members: MoE; Producer; NGO; Institute for Chemical Technology 
Prague) 
23.6.1998 First supplement 
Enhancement of targets 
2000 Re-opening of negotiations 
23.7.2001 Second supplement 
Time-horizon 
Enhancement of targets 
Framing 
2004  Access to EU  
Czech detergents are covered by European regulation 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
 
4.4.2 Evaluation of success factors 
Problem solving capacity 
The agreement can be called successful, as targets seem to be reached. According 
to a study of Sauer (2001: 88) producers have respected the declared levels. On 
the other hand the share of compact detergents was not raised significantly. As at 
the moment no direct and actual data is available, an evaluation from 2002 
(Dvorak 2002: 213 / see Figure 8) confirms that the total use of phosphate in 
laundry detergents is reduced. 
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Figure 8: Development of the amount of phosphate in laundry detergents 
 
Source: Report of the working-group for evaluation of the agreement (cited from Dvorak 2002: 213) 
 
The targets of the agreement are quantified and formulated in concrete objectives 
to be reached in 2005. The quantified objectives are not as high as technically 
possible. With the argument of rising costs for consumers and restrictions due to 
cleaning capacity of detergents, the producers resisted the public wish to ban 
phosphates totally. Thus, the 5.5 percent objective is only a compromise. In 
relation to other European countries the target is not very ambitious. The 
relatively weak position of the public authority can be considered as consequence 
from the absence of a concrete goal formulated in political debate. However, 
targets exceed a business-as-usual-scenario, as because of its characteristics and 
low price the use of phosphate would rather grow than decrease. Thus, the worst 
aspect of the 1995 agreement was certainly the missing of a time frame to reach 
the objectives  
With regard to the compliance mechanisms, the Czech example is ambivalent. On 
the one hand side, nearly no sanctions or incentives are relevant and a monitoring 
procedure was not formally described in the agreement process. On the other 
hand, the latter point was solved quite quickly. Already in 1996, it became 
obviously that the agreement would not work without a formalised evaluation 
procedure. Hence, a working group was established incorporating NGOs and 
scientific institutions.  
The framing of the Czech agreement is the most critical aspect. Even if there are 
some sanctions (payment in case of non-compliance of 1,000,000 CZK (33,000 
EUR)), the agreement is not embedded in a regulative framework. The only 
opportunity to push industry to compliance is to threat by proposing legislative 
action. This threat is very helpful as the 2001 improvement shows. Although 
framing was limited, free-riding supposed to be rather unimportant. Firstly, most 
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of the companies are multinational, so that adoption of product improvements is a 
manageable task. Secondly, the five firms represent about 90 percent of detergent 
market. As the number of participants is small, a control of compliance in direct 
interactions between public authority and companies is possible. 
Regarding soft effects, the amendments of the agreement show that learning 
effects probably occurred. From an overall perspective, dissemination of infor-
mation and learning effects, mutual trust and promotion of awareness are likely to 
happen through the establishment of a common working and evaluation group. 
However, innovation pressure is very low. As solutions to the phosphate problem 
already existed in other countries, the development of new techniques to replace 
or substitute phosphor was not necessary. It is more about technology transfer 
than innovation. 
Table 15: Problem solving capacity of Czech detergent agreement 
Description of case Success factors 
Ambitious targets  
Targets extend business-as-usual Ambitiousness of targets: Targets more 
than business-as-usual 
Environmental situation is improved even if more 
would be possible 
Improvement of environmental situation 
Fail to significantly raise the use of compact 
detergents 
Soft targets should be avoided 
Quantified objectives exist but no intermediate targets Quantified and staged objectives 
Compliance mechanisms   
Annual reports are obligatory and a working group 
was established 
Reporting procedure 
Independent actors (NGO and scientist) control the 
reports 
Independent verification of results 
Civil law contract between public and private actor; 
but there are doubts about status as legal binding 
contract 
Status as legally binding 
External threat of regulation External threat of regulation 
Inbuilt sanction in form of non-compliance fee Internal compliance-factors included 
Soft effects  
The working group for monitoring is an institution-
alised arena to encourage learning  
Institutionalisation of environmental 
working groups 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
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Legitimacy 
Even if no independent actors were formally involved in the negotiations, the 
legitimacy of the agreement must be considered as rather good. This could be 
based on two arguments. On the one hand, there were real negotiations between 
the Environmental Ministry, representing environmental interests, and the 
Industry. This constellation is in most cases better than talks between the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and the industry as environmental interests are excluded. On 
the other hand, independent actors were involved in the monitoring process. As 
monitoring is very important for the compliance with the agreed targets, this 
supports fulfilment as well as improvements of the agreement. 
Table 16: Legitimacy of Czech detergent agreement 
Description of case Success factors 
The annual meetings of the evaluation group serve the 
information  
Information of the public and trans-
parency 
The Ministry of Environment was responsible on side 
of the government and NGOs are involved  
Involvement of environmental interests 
(environmental authority / NGOs) 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
 
Costs 
No cost calculations were made prior to agreeing on a common text. But with 
regard to costs, the Czech example must be stated as quite inexpensive. The 
estimated costs on preparation, negotiation and concluding of the agreement were 
12,000 to 14,000 EUR. The annual monitoring costs are estimated on 600 EUR 
(Dvorak et al. 2002: 212). Thus, the financial burden for the public authority was 
low. Costs for the companies, related to the enhancement of the level of public 
information about an impact of laundry detergents on an environment and about 
compact detergents, have been low as well. The companies’ activities in this way 
have been rather limited. 
4.4.3 Lessons to be learned 
Generally speaking, the Czech voluntary agreement on gradual reduction of 
impact of laundry detergents on the environment is a target-oriented agreement 
with a limited scope and a relation to a specific environmental problem like phos-
phate water pollution. It is a product related agreement that tries to influence the 
design and components of laundry detergents. The quantified targets are slightly 
ambitious but are likely to be reached. In contrast to that, soft objectives like pro-
viding consumer information and promoting compact detergents failed. A critical 
point concerning targets is the weakness of political objectives related to the use 
of phosphates. The voluntary agreement cannot replace the formulation of the 
political will. 
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On the one hand side, the agreement was enabled faster than legislation process 
leading to limits on phosphates. On the other hand side, the company-parties of 
the agreement have not been pressed heavily to develop a very ambitious effort to 
decrease the phosphate ingredients. Thus, there was a high danger of a regulatory 
capture. But in contrast to traditional regulation, further aspects — like increasing 
the share of compact detergents, the use of eco-labelling as well as to enhance the 
level of knowledge and information of the public — could have been covered by 
one single text. These characteristics make the agreement to a very lean approach 
facing a complex problem. 
Nevertheless it must been stated that the framing of the agreement is rather 
limited. The sanction fee of 1,000,000 CZK (29,000 EUR) is only symbolic for 
large companies like Henkel or Unilever. As no corresponding regulation exists, it 
is difficult to develop an adequate incentive or sanction for fulfilling the agree-
ment. Therefore, the access to the European Union and especially the threat of 
working out a regulation seemed to be very helpful to motivate industry in good 
performance. Remarkable is the incorporation of NGOs in the monitoring pro-
cedure. Thereby, additional pressure and more independent control were possible, 
finally leading to amendments like the introduction of a time frame. 
 
4.5 Case Study 4: Commitment on phasing out of poly-
brominated diphenylethers (PBDE) as flame retardant 
in synthetic materials (Germany) 
Contrary to the Czech Republic, the fourth case is addressed to a voluntary 
agreement that is related to a production process and portrays a case closer to self-
regulation. It deals with the phasing out of polybrominated diphenylether (PBDE) 
as flame retardants in plastics. The most important applications are in the field of 
electrical and electro technical industry, e.g. in radio and television receiver.  
Regarding the environmental effects, the agreement contributes to the reduction of 
water and air pollution as well as to the reduction of soil contamination. The 
synthetic producing industry is a part of the chemical sector. This case can be seen 
as a good example, as it demonstrates how fast, e.g. within four years, a voluntary 
agreement can lead to an overall abolishment of specific noxious substances in the 
production process of industries. Moreover, the agreement focuses on safety at 
work, too.  
4.5.1 Description of the agreement 
The German agreement is a negotiated self-commitment in form of a declaration. 
It grasps all relevant aspects leading to the conclusion and contains a list of 
measures that will be put into practice to achieve the environmental goals.  
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In the context of the discussion about Dioxin and its disastrous impact on health, 
also polybrominated diphenylether used as flame retardants in synthetic materials 
raises suspicion that during the smouldering polybrominated dibenzodioxins and 
dibenzofuranes emerge and are released. There have been two reasons being 
responsible for starting the initiative: Firstly, it was intended to achieve a substan-
tial reduction of dioxin pollutants in air, water and soil. Especially the knowledge 
that these substances reach the food chain and accumulate in human’s body was 
subject to serious concerns. A further point were the risks workers are exposed 
during the production process. In case of heating over 600° Celsius the substances 
release and attain easily the respiratory tract. It could be seen as a violation of 
occupational health and safety that may lead to legal consequences. 
Box 3:  Environmental impact and role of PBDE 
Polybrominated diphenylether (PBDE), group designation for DecaPBDE, OctaPBDE 
and PentaPBDE, are organically compounds with different degrees of bromination. They 
are used in various plastics as additive flame retardants. As they possess a high effect in 
flame resistance, a broad range of possible applications and favourable prices, 
polybrominated diphenylether are mainly used in the electronic industry, for building 
materials as well as in the textile (furniture) industry.  
Over the last decades, the worldwide consumption of four flame retardants has almost 
doubled. Some brominated flame retardants (BFR) are regarded as persistent compounds, 
which accumulate in the food chain (e.g. PentaPBDE, TBBPA). In case of uncontrolled 
burning, brominated dioxin and furan will be generated. They are suspected to possess a 
carcinogenic (e.g. DecaPBDE) und hormone accumulating impact (e.g. PentaPBDE). 
During the waste combustion, their noxious substances attain to water, air and soil. 
Finally, the polybrominated diphenylether can reach the food chain. Polybrominated 
diphenylether are direct preliminary stages of dioxin. In case of burning, apart from the 
normal gases dioxin and further products of decomposition evolve. 
Source: Ökotest 2004 
The German government can be regarded as the main initiator for the voluntary 
commitment. It took the responsibility for a survey on the emergence of dioxin in 
case of the combustion of plastics that has been realised in 1985 by the Federal 
Environmental Agency. Talks among the Federal Environmental Agency, the 
Federal Health Agency, the Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing 
and representatives of the chemical industry gave reason for corresponding 
inquiries. First results induce further tests, but before getting the updated findings 
the Association of Synthetics Processing Industries committed themselves to the 
phasing out of PBDE. 
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The agreement took the form of a unilateral commitment. De facto, it is a letter 
from the industry to the Minister of Environment incorporating the specification 
of targets, measures to reach the targets, information about the danger and 
monitoring. The quantified target within the agreement is the total renouncement, 
i.e. a 100 percent reduction of polybrominated diphenylether (point 1). The 
development of substitutes for the polybrominated diphenylether constitutes the 
qualitative goal. Therefore, a time frame until 1990 is given. The agreement incor-
porates a list of measures to be implemented to reach the promised goals: 
• Immediate stop of developing plastics that contains polybrominated 
diphenylethers as flame retardants; 
• Development of substitutes in cooperation with the customers to fulfil the legal 
framework on fire standards; 
• As far as measures are not possible for the short term, customers have to be 
informed about the problems; 
• Informing the public authorities regularly about the degree of substitution; 
• The respective companies of the association commit to an investigation 
programme for the elaboration on risk assessment. The collaboration with 
relevant actors has been offered.  
Concerning monitoring, a regular report shall inform about the progression 
achieved through the implemented measures, and the elaboration of an investi-
gation programme for the risk assessment served as a base for evaluations. 
However, there were negotiations between the Federal Environmental Agency and 
the Association of the Chemical Industry; no NGO was involved in this process. 
Indeed, public discussions about the danger of dioxin have mainly contributed to 
the starting of the process. The motivation of the Association of the Chemical 
Industry results from the outcomes of the first examinations, claimed by public 
authorities, on what kind of substances may be released by PBDE in case of 
heating up at a certain temperature, and what impact may be caused by the 
emerging decomposition products. A further motivation to commit the phase-out 
surely was the menace of hard legal regulations that let no or just little scope for 
self-determined action. 
The legal framework 
Regulations concerning hazardous materials exist in the Federal Republic of 
Germany for a long time. In the early 1980s when PBDE came under suspect to 
cause serious health problems no other member state of the European Union 
except Germany has been developed adequate regulation. Even till 2004, no other 
country has dealt with the problem. Now, an EU-wide guideline bans the use of 
polybrominated diphenylether as flame retardants. This was a result of a risk 
assessment in the context of the EU programme on recyclables. 
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Table 17: Overview of the German PBDE phase-out commitment 
Problem Polybrominated diphenylethers contaminating water, air and soil 
Objectives Phase-out of polybrominated diphenylethers as flame retardants in plastics 
through: 
Development and use of substitutes  
Total renunciation of PBDE as flame retardants in synthetics 
Actors Agreement parties: 
The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety 
Federal Environmental Agency  
Association of the Chemical Industry/Association of Synthetic Processing 
Industries 
Time 1986 to 1990 
Framework No direct German regulation concerning PBDE 
Threat of regulation 
EU-guideline in force since 2004 (EU 76/769/EEC) 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
 
The agreement process 
Disastrous accidents in chemical factories in Seveso/Italy (1976) and Bhopal/ 
India (1980) constitute the starting point of the discussions about the impact of 
dioxin on the living environment. This led to a process of rethinking concerning 
the treatment of certain substances. In this context, the beginning of the debate 
about PBDE was characterized by the raising of awareness concerning the 
environmental problems. Talks between representatives of several relevant 
ministries and the industry led to subsequent examinations on the chemical 
reactions of polybrominated diphenylether. The results were worrying and cause 
further investigations. Before receiving the newest results, the Association of the 
Chemical Industry declared the self-commitment in August 1986.  
The first measures have already been implemented in the last quarter of 1986, 
shortly after signing of the commitment. At the beginning of 1987 the quantitative 
data for 1986 have been surveyed and served as a base for the subsequent develop-
ment. The required apprpriate development of substitutes was accompanied by 
technical problems: New “ingredients” demanded for new conditions of processing 
what influenced the characteristics of the end product. Due to international safety 
standards, a scrutiny of the altered products had to be realized. Moreover, the 
succeeding industries like for example the electronic industry had to implement 
large-scale safety tests, too. This led to a delay in implementing measures.  
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4.5.2 Evaluation of success factors 
The German case study, dealing with the abatement of PBDE, is a good example 
that allows learning towards how the phase-out of hazardous substances can be 
organised flexibly.  
Problem solving capacity 
The agreement has contributed to the protection of environment and people. With 
98 percent reduction of PBDE realized in 1990, the target was almost reached (see 
Figure 9). However, the improvement of the environmental situation has to be 
considered from another point of view: The amount of synthetic materials pro-
vided with PBDE by the German synthetic producing industry accounts for only 
one percent of all synthetics. As no other country has been released guidelines on 
the use of PBDE, imports of substances and products are still a danger for the 
living environment in Germany. 
Figure 9: The reduction on the sale of synthetics containing PBDE  
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Source: Wuppertal Institute, based on documents of the Association of Synthetic Producing Industries 
 
The framing of the German agreement is not very strong, as it is a self-commit-
ment that is not legally binding. There are no sanctions in case of non-compliance. 
On the other side, the threat for the industry is the possible hard legal ban on the 
respective substances and products. Although a legal framework does not exist, 
the problem of free-riding has not been observed. Also the monitoring process 
within this agreement is not worked out in detail. The only point fixed in the 
agreement is the commitment to inform the public authorities regularly on the 
development of the process. The association has been agreed upon to realise 
regularly own surveys of the related companies and to transfer the results to the 
respective public authorities. The evaluation base is the elaborated investigation 
programme on risk assessment. 
There are just a few soft effects that have been developed in the context of this 
process. In addition to the public discussion about the impact of dioxin a raising 
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awareness about the danger coming from noxious substances in daily life has been 
evolved. This was promoted through the commitment on informing customers 
about the potential risks of polybrominated diphenylether. Grievous concerns 
about the impact of dioxin related substances and vivid public discussion 
increases innovation pressure that causes rapid development of chemical 
substitutes. 
Table 18: Problem solving capacity of German PBDE phase-out commitment 
Description of case Success factors 
Ambitious targets  
Targets extend business-as-usual Targets more than business-as-usual 
Very easy and quantified objectives exist  
No intermediate targets (because of the short time 
frame) 
Quantified and staged objectives 
Improved environmental situation, but still PBDE 
products sold in Germany (imported) 
Improvement of environmental situation 
Compliance mechanisms   
Regular surveys and reports (no time frame defined) Reporting procedure 
Threat of implementing a legal ban Threat of regulation (the shadow of 
hierarchy)  
Soft effects  
The commitment led to a raise of awareness about 
PBDE related risks (studies carried out).  
Dissemination of information and pro-
motion of awareness 
High innovation pressure as other components had to 
replace PBDE within four years 
Innovation pressure 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
Legitimacy 
Two important actors were involved in the process: the responsible environmental 
ministry and agency as well as the concerned industry. They designed this nego-
tiated self-commitment, but did not involve actors of the civil society like NGOs. 
Nonetheless, this agreement can be regarded as legitimate. 
Costs 
Regarding the costs emerging from the process, two different aspects have to be 
stressed. Firstly, the implementation of safety test after the required alteration of 
the synthetics is cost-intensive. Secondly, the higher prices resulting from the 
expensive test led to market deficits as foreign companies still exported their 
PBDE-containing products to the German market where they have been sold at 
cheaper prices. An additional burden of a public authority does not exist. 
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Table 19: Legitimacy of German PBDE phase-out commitment 
Description of case Success factors 
Public participation was not carried out during 
negotiations  
Information has been communicated to industry’s 
customers 
Information of the public and trans-
parency 
The environmental ministry and relevant agencies were 
involved 
No information on the acceptance in society available 
Involvement of environmental interests 
(environmental authority / NGOs)  
Broad acceptance in society 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
 
4.5.3 Lessons to be learned 
The agreement is a self-commitment strongly influenced by public discussions 
and grievous concerns of the public environmental authorities about the impact of 
dioxin on the living environment. It is an example for a very simple and short 
agreement (or commitment) addressing one particular environmental problem. 
Clear defined quantitative and qualitative targets are subject to the agreement. 
Intermediate stages have not been incorporated in the agreement, possibly due to 
the short time frame of four years. The environmental target led to a rapid solution 
of the problem giving the companies some flexibility in looking for substitutes 
and change of production processes.  
The phase-out commitment shows that co-operative action between public 
authorities and industry can lead to solutions without regulation. However, the 
framing aspect is the most critical point within the implementation of the agree-
ment. Except the threat of regulation, neither sanctions nor incentives were set up. 
E.g. it could have been a positive measure of the government to give the 
perspective of a ban of PBDE in Germany from 1990. Thereby, the efforts of 
German industry would have led to a competition advantage in relation to foreign 
companies still using PBDE.  
Generally speaking, there are rather simple and effective forms of voluntary 
agreements as well. But the opportunity to choose such an approach is closely 
connected to the environmental problem. 
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5 Success factors in a comparative perspective 
 
The presented case studies provide the basis for the definition of success factors. 
There are well designed and organised aspects that show how voluntary agree-
ments lead to successful results. The comparative perspective is not only a chance 
to identify the most important aspects but gives information about the influence of 
the institutional and cultural background for success. In the detailed analysis of 
the cases, the special strengths and weaknesses of the cases have been already 
described. Developing these findings further on and carrying out a comparative 
analysis provides additional and more general information than single cases can 
do. 
However, analysing success of voluntary agreements in terms of an improvement 
of the environmental situation is a comprehensive task. Observed environmental 
progress could be caused by other measures too, while success could be over-
shadowed through developments in other sectors. While in relation to pollution 
abatement of large industrial facilities this is manageable, other contexts and 
problems are more complex19.  
The comparative analysis and the formulation of more general success factors 
follow the terms “problem solving capacity”, “legitimacy” and “costs”. The focus 
of this analysis lays on problem solving capacity regarding environmental effects. 
In a second step, success factors regarding the emergence are described. Thereby, 
the context must be considered. This is particularly important because this study 
aims at providing a basis for policy transfer.  
5.1 Success factors for problem solving capacity 
Problem solving capacity is the main dimension of the evaluation of the case 
studies (see chapter 4.1.2). It is closely related to the direct and indirect environ-
mental effects of the agreements. As success can be related to an improvement of 
the environmental situation, success factors for problem solving capacity are 
elements of the agreement or measures in the process of developing and imple-
menting agreements that make the effects occur and contribute to a more positive 
environmental situation. However, direct links between agreement and improve-
ment of the environment are seldom. Only the German phase-.out commitment of 
PBDE shows a clear link between the policy instrument and the environment. The 
difficulties are rooted in the fact that the development of the environment is 
                                                19	  	   Especially	   in	   cases	   where	   an	   instrument	   is	   part	   of	   a	   policy	   mix,	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   actors	   are	  collectively	   responsible	   or	   policies	   addressing	   only	   a	   limited	   range	   of	   actors,	   a	   policy	   cannot	   be	  easily	  tied	  to	  an	  improvement	  of	  the	  environmental	  situation.	  E.g.	  addressing	  problems	  like	  climate	  change	  or	  aiming	  at	  sectors	  with	  fragmented	  structures	  (like	  a	  high	  number	  of	  small	  and	  medium	  sized	  companies)	  complicate	  the	  measuring	  of	  success.	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depending on several different factors like e.g. unintended side effects, economic 
growth or technological development. The effect of one single measure (the 
agreement) can therefore be overshadowed or supported by other trends. Hence, 
the analysis of agreements is difficult as long as there is no specific concept for 
operationalising environmental effectiveness with regard to the specific case.  
While some scientific studies employ a set of evaluation criteria derived from 
other cases or experiences or base their suggestions on rational models of 
decision-making, others only assess the compliance with the previously defined 
political objectives (e.g. Mol et al. 2000). However, all of these approaches have 
difficulties and problems. To come to a simple and useable framework for 
assessment, this study will focus on three substantive dimensions of success:  
1. The ambitiousness of agreed targets;  
2. The compliance with these targets; and 
3. The contribution towards policy learning.  
While the first point refers to the environmental situation, the second is only 
connected to internal developments of the agreement. The third aspect of policy 
learning is pointing towards long-term related soft effects based on the 
cooperative relation between industry and environmental authorities. However, 
the main categories for evaluation are ambitiousness and compliance. Only if both 
aspects are fulfilled, a voluntary agreement can be successful. In other words: 
Even if industry complies with targets, if these are not ambitious, an agreement 
cannot be called successful. The same conclusion is valid for the opposite 
constellation: If targets are ambitious but industry fails to reach them, the 
agreement is not successful as well. The emergence of soft effects is only an 
additional positive outcome. 
Generally spoken, these three substantive dimensions help to operationalize the 
term “problem solving capacity”. Along these concepts success factors are 
presented in the following paragraphs. These success factors are based on the four 
cases and they take the form of procedural mechanisms that contributed to the 
positive outcome of the agreements.  
Indeed, the results are not completely new as other studies show similar results 
and recommendations. Nevertheless, the presented systemisation helps to 
conceptualise good practice and connect it to different phases of the agreement 
process. 
5.1.1 Ambitiousness of targets 
Voluntary agreements cover a broad range of policy issues. Thus, the targets can 
be manifold from phasing out hazardous substances to energy efficiency and 
reduction of CO2 emissions through product design (ACEA case).  
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Target setting is the central task in each voluntary agreement process. A first task 
is to check if the agreement and its proposed targets are in line with the political 
targets that are defined in development plans, sustainability strategies or multi-
lateral agreements between nation states. Secondly, the even politically defined 
targets should not be symbolic. Without ambitious targets agreements turn to be 
symbolic policies that do not have any environmental effect. For the definition of 
“ambitiousness” it is necessary to define a business-as-usual trend. Only if the 
targets extend the measures that would have been taken anyway, additional effects 
can be expected. Hence, a first success factor is to define a business-as-usual trend 
prior to the negotiations. This task is mostly not very complicated. In the selected 
agreements this seemed to be fulfilled, even if e.g. in the ACEA-agreement the 
Commissions attempts were not sufficient. 
Nevertheless, the business-as-usual trend is often connected to strong environ-
mental problems and targets only related to this scale could still be problematic. 
While e.g. the phase out of PBDE is an adequate measure, the ACEA agreement 
shows that even the agreed targets are still not ambitious enough to contribute to 
major improvements. In this context, the Dutch LTA provides an interesting 
approach towards realistic but still ambitious targets. Prior to negotiations, scien-
tific studies concerning the potential for energy efficiency in production processes 
were carried out. These studies provided a pragmatic picture of possible measures 
and showed a rough trend on what the targets could look like. Thus, an 
independent analysis of targets is rather helpful in negotiations. 
After defining the ambitiousness, further aspects related to targets are relevant. A 
common element of voluntary agreements is the long-term perspective and the 
challenges to organise a process of environmental improvements. Two aspects are 
crucial to come to reasonable results: Quantified, staged objectives and a clear 
time horizon for implementation. These success factors are especially important in 
order to measure and evaluate compliance. Thereby, an important aspect is the 
precision and opportunity to measure success. An aspect of the Czech case under-
lines, that the vague performance target to encourage the use of compact laundry 
detergents is less successful than the quantified goal to reduce phosphor to 5.5 
percent. In the Dutch LTA, the development of the energy efficiency index (EEI) 
was a crucial element for reaching consensus about an objective that is still easy 
to measure and to monitor. 
In addition to the definition of targets a concrete time-horizon as well as a well-
organized implementation process is needed. Only if a certain date is linked to the 
targets, control is possible and motivation to act is raised. Regarding the timing of 
the implementation process, the Dutch benchmarking covenant provides an 
important feature of a well organised and structured process. The Czech case 
demonstrates how important a timeframe can be. Due to criticism and slow pro-
gress, a time horizon has been added afterwards. This led to a more effective 
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agreement. Furthermore, industry can act relatively flexible within the time-
horizon. However, it must be considered that long-term perspectives incorporate 
the danger of starting measures too late. Furthermore, intermediate targets are 
quite useful to remind actors to their commitments and allow an appraisal through 
monitoring. The ACEA-agreement is a good example for intermediate targets: 
They initiate early action especially in a long-term perspective for e.g. ten years. 
In summary, five success factors towards ambitious target setting can be identi-
fied: independent analysis, relation to political targets, going beyond business-as-
usual, quantified and easily measurable targets as well as a concrete time horizon 
with interim objectives. As Table 20 shows the four presented cases perform 
rather well in target setting. However in most cases, there is still a discourse if 
targets are strong enough. Therefore, it is useful to have a public debate about the 
targets and possible additional measures in the policy mix.  
Table 20:  Comparative analysis of success factors for target setting 
 Dutch LTA and 
benchmarking 
ACEA agree-
ment 
Czech Deter-
gent agreement 
German phase-
out commitment 
of PBDE 
Independent analysis  
of the problem 
√3 –√ – 3 
Relation to politically 
defined targets (Only LTA) 3 – 3 
Going beyond  
business-as-usual 3 (3) 3 3 
Quantified targets 
 3 3 3 3 
Time horizon and  
interim targets 3 3 
Introduced 
later 3 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
 
A specific case in target setting is the benchmarking covenant. A concrete target 
of the covenant is to develop specific targets at the company level. Through the 
definition of a method more flexible and more adjusted targets could be 
developed. Thus the allocation of measures is supported. Nevertheless, the targets 
could be quite ambitious on company level. Due to the clear time horizon and the 
organisation of measures this kind of target setting is an alternative to a quantified 
objective. Even though, this is only needed to address complex problems like 
climate change. For problems like the hazards of substances like in the German 
case, such an approach is not needed. 
Review of Voluntary Approaches in the European Union 77	  
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy 
5.1.2 Compliance with targets 
After agreeing on certain targets, the implementation of measures towards 
compliance with those objectives is the next step to come to successful 
agreements. At that stage, it is rather helpful if the agreements have the status of 
being legally binding. In that case, the relation between public and private actors 
is similar to implementation of command-and-control approaches. In the Dutch 
LTA as well as in the Czech detergent agreement civil law contracts between the 
parties establish a legal based relation. In the Dutch LTA even single companies 
and not business associations commit themselves to act towards the goals of the 
(sector-) agreement.  
But the legal form is not a guarantee for compliance. Non-binding agreements can 
be as successful as binding ones. The German and the ACEA example show that 
the lack of the status does not automatically lead to non-compliance. That is 
mainly related to two aspects: framing and monitoring. While framing means to 
take measures that actively support implementation, monitoring is the control 
dimension of voluntary agreements. 
Incentives and sanctions 
Incentives and sanctions can be used to frame the implementation of the voluntary 
agreement. The metaphor of “carrots and sticks” outlines the underlying 
governance approach of helping industry to act on the one hand and requiring 
action on the other hand. In this context, it does not depend crucially on the fact 
whether these incentives and sanctions are built inside the agreement as a 
paragraph or if they exist independently like e.g. subsidies for energy efficient 
technology.  
The Czech and the Dutch cases are examples for in-built factors like the link to a 
permit system (LTA) and emissions trading (benchmarking) or a fee that must be 
paid in the case of non-compliance (detergent agreement). The existence of 
working groups supports awareness and compliance in both cases. In the Dutch 
case, other learning procedures like best practice information or consultant 
involvement are supportive elements. Furthermore, the requirements of a com-
pany specific energy efficiency plan as well as the phasing of the procedures and 
measures to be taken are very detailed and further examples for framing imple-
mentation of the agreement. In addition, the monitoring procedure can be under-
stood as an internal framing, as well.  
The LTA case is also a good example for external framing. The existence of a 
National Environmental Policy Plan and supportive subsidies push imple-
mentation of energy efficiency measures. Generally speaking, external framing 
means the integration in a policy mix. That is important because various matters 
and policy instruments could address industry and support each other. The co-
existence of voluntary agreements and labelling of products to change consumer 
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behaviour, realised e.g. in the ACEA case, is a good example. Especially in 
product related policies, a policy mix seems to be necessary. A consumer stimulus 
was missing in the Czech detergent agreement, which could be an explanation of 
the failure of the soft target “increasing the share of compact detergents”.  
To sum up, success factors are the design of in-built incentives and sanctions as 
well as external framing through the integration of the agreement in a policy mix. 
In each specific situation this could be very heterogeneous.  
Reporting and monitoring 
Monitoring is very important in order to control the efforts made by industry. In 
this task, there are very few differences to command-and-control approaches. The 
existence of a regular evaluation and supervision of results is a crucial element to 
make industry comply with the agreed targets. Without monitoring, the danger of 
non-compliance and free riding is relatively high. Thus, not only the environ-
mental situation, but also the implemented measure should be observed. To 
develop an ambitious good monitoring scheme, a comprehensive methodology is 
needed (e.g. the Dutch LTA).  
In all case studies monitoring was carried out. Even though, the design of 
reporting in the German case was much weaker than in other examples. The 
monitoring for the benchmarking covenant requires annual reporting and an 
independent authority controls compliance. This is an important factor as the data 
are delivered by the enterprises themselves. In the Czech case a monitoring 
working group was built up. Within this group, the Environmental Ministry and 
the NGOs controlled the efforts and progresses. The efforts of the European 
Parliament pushed forward the development of monitoring for the ACEA-agree-
ment. Without such a comprehensive system and the public access to the infor-
mation, the pressure for compliance would be lower. 
Generally speaking, success factors with regard to monitoring are: transparent 
reporting procedure (aggregated data should be published), a methodology to 
secure standard and the incorporation of an independent verifier. 
Overview of compliance factors 
In contrast to the first step of target setting, compliance is a critical task of the 
presented case studies. In a comparative perspective, the analysis shows a very 
heterogeneous picture. While the German phase-out commitment for PBDE did 
only refer to a simple threat of legislative action, the Dutch case shows an 
ambitious and highly evolved system of incentives to participate and sanctions to 
push companies. Even if it depends on the specific political situation and the 
environmental problem addressed, the Dutch LTAs are exemplary for organising 
an implementation process that actively supports compliance. It even has strong 
similarities to public schemes like EMAS.  
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The weaker performance of the ACEA and the Czech case are probably related to 
these aspects. The agreements are simply framed by political pressure and the 
“threat of regulation”. There is no institutionalised and permanent push towards 
compliance that is independent from political debate. However, the German case 
shows that even without sophisticated incentives and sanctions, the fulfilment of 
targets is possible. But the danger of non-compliance is much higher. The failure 
of the German industry to fulfil its 1996 declaration for climate protection 
illustrates this danger. 
The differences between the evaluated agreements are smaller in monitoring. The 
set up of a reporting procedure and a monitoring methodology is a basic require-
ment. Independent verifiers like the European Parliament, the Czech working 
group including NGOs or SenterNovem in the LTA demonstrate that the 
credibility of implementation increases. 
Table 21:  Comparative analysis of success factors for compliance with targets 
 Dutch LTA and 
benchmarking 
ACEA agree-
ment 
Czech Detergent 
agreement 
German phase-
out commit-
ment of PBDE 
Legally binding 
 3 – 3 – 
Individual company 
responsibility  3 – – – 
Independent actor for 
process organisation 3 – – – 
Internal incentives 
and sanctions 3 – Only small fee – 
External incentives 
and sanctions 3 
Threat of 
regulation 
Threat of 
regulation 
Threat of 
regulation 
Transparent reporting 
procedure 3 3 3 3 
Independent verifica-
tion of reported 
results 
3 3 Working group including NGOs – 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
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5.1.3 Soft effects towards learning 
Last but not least, soft effects towards learning are a further element of the prob-
lem solving capacity of voluntary agreements. However, soft effects do neither 
support ambitious targets nor compliance. Soft effects do not directly affect 
environmental effectiveness but contribute indirectly to an improvement of the 
environment in a long-term perspective.  
Firstly, the agreement itself and the monitoring reports support information 
dissemination and transfer of knowledge. In the four case studies agreements are 
concluded with business associations that serve as an intermediate actor between 
the companies. In addition, the fact that companies have to react on the agreement 
makes them think about solutions and supports innovation. Furthermore, the 
Dutch case demonstrates that information exchange in working groups or visits 
through external consultants promote awareness.  
In a comparative perspective, soft effects and learning are supported in the four 
cases. The success factors are dissemination of information, working groups and 
incorporation of intermediate organisations. 
Table 22:  Comparative analysis of success factors for soft effects 
 Dutch LTA and 
benchmarking 
ACEA agree-
ment 
Czech Deter-
gent agreement 
German phase-
out commitment 
of PBDE 
Dissemination of 
information 3 3 3 – 
Institutionalisation of 
working groups 3 – – – 
Incorporation of 
inter-mediate 
organisation 
3 – – – 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
 
5.2 Legitimacy and costs 
Legitimacy and costs are not the focus of this study. Nevertheless, some more 
general aspects are discussed in a comparative perspective. Only if the outcome is 
in line with democratic norms and the costs do not exceed the ones of regulation, 
voluntary agreements constitute a possible alternative. 
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Legitimacy 
The theoretical problem of voluntary agreements is that the addressed actor of the 
instrument (industry) is able to influence the objectives and avoid independent 
control. Above all, the situation of regulatory capture must be absolutely 
prevented. If private actors succeed in avoiding measures that would have been 
obligatory by introducing regulation, the function of the government to act along 
common and public interests fails. Like already mentioned with regards to targets, 
political goals and the public opinion must be dominant to guarantee legitimacy. 
As a consequence the substantive dimension of legitimacy is the acceptance in 
society. If there is a public debate about the problem and the possible measures 
and the outcome is accepted broadly, there are no democratic problems with using 
voluntary agreements. The more procedural success factors that refer to such 
broad acceptance are twofold: 
1. Transparency and information of the public  
2. Involvement of public interests (e.g. multi stakeholder dialogue) 
While the first is closely related to monitoring, the second success factor points at 
participation and involvement of independent actors. As mentioned before, 
monitoring is a basic requirement and is fulfilled in all of the assessed cases. 
Problems, like the publication of company specific data were solved by publishing 
aggregated information. Regarding involvement of independent actors, a com-
parative analysis shows a more heterogeneous picture. While in the Czech case 
NGOs participate in monitoring, the Dutch government excludes totally inde-
pendent actors but involves an intermediate organisation in order to guarantee 
objectiveness. In the ACEA case, the European Parliament called for more 
involvement, which led to a better monitoring procedure and a better acceptance 
of the agreement. Only in the German case, no independent actors are involved 
directly. However, the very ambitious target of totally phasing-out a substance 
cannot be criticised with regard to legitimacy. 
Costs 
One of the main arguments for voluntary agreements is the cost-effectiveness. 
Unfortunately, the four presented case studies do not provide substantial infor-
mation about the costs of voluntary agreements. Much more detailed analysis 
would have been necessary. 
However, some more general and logically deducted principles are developed. To 
reach cost-effectiveness, a cost calculation in advance could be helpful. The basic 
principle should be to avoid a disproportionate burden for the public authority and 
the enterprises. In a comparative perspective it can be assumed that especially the 
framing of an agreement towards compliance leads to costs for the public actors. 
In target setting, independent studies will be responsible for the biggest share in 
costs. The negotiation itself probably does not require major expenditures. 
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Furthermore, implementation can imply a certain amount of money, especially if 
the targets to achieve are very ambitious.  
Thus, the Dutch LTA and the benchmarking are likely to be the “most expensive” 
of the four cases. Nevertheless, under the perspective of a price-performance ratio, 
they could even have been the cheapest solution. 
5.3 Context and emergence of voluntary agreements 
Voluntary agreements cannot be examined without having a closer look to their 
political context as it may have a strong influence on their design and 
performance. Furthermore, it is also important to consider the circumstances that 
contributed to their emergence. This can shed light on the probability whether 
new voluntary agreements will develop in other circumstances. Therefore, the 
concept of governance capacity is used to discuss some basic principles concern-
ing the emergence of agreements. For a more detailed picture, the role of the 
political context is highlighted. Even if there is not enough context information 
available to explain emergence fully in the four case studies, it is possible to 
develop some hypotheses what success factors for the emergence of agreements 
and company participation are.  
5.3.1 Governance capacity 
One reason for the emergence of voluntary agreements can be seen in the context 
of the problem structure and the governance capacity of public and private actors 
to solve environmental problems. As already mentioned, nowadays these 
problems are highly complex and persisting, which restricts the governance 
capacity of public actors. Governance capacity is defined as the possibility to 
design a certain policy towards a policy goal and to implement this policy. These 
problems cannot be solved by regulation alone, and a more comprehensive 
approach including regulation, voluntary agreements and other policy instruments 
is needed. The aspect of governance capacity with a view on public-private 
interaction has been analysed with more detail by Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002).  
A precondition for voluntary agreements is the fact that the governance capacity 
of industry is high as it takes over responsibility to carry out parts of environ-
mental policy. This high capability to contribute to policy solutions can be used 
by public authorities in order to implement environmental policies.  
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Figure 10:  Ideal-type constellations of public and private interactions 
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If the governance capacity of the public actors is low, e.g. due to a lack of infor-
mation on the problem, this constellation is likely to result in self-regulation or 
unilateral commitments. A good example for this constellation where the 
governance capacity of the public actor was low is the ACEA-agreement where 
the EU’s capacity to tackle the problem of CO2 emissions from cars was rather 
limited. Consequently, a voluntary agreement with ACEA became a major target 
in reducing these emissions. 
If the governance capacity of the public actor is high as well, both actors are able 
to contribute to special policy measures. This constellation can lead to regulated 
self-regulation and thus, voluntary agreements signed by the public authority and 
industry. The policy style of these voluntary agreements is more cooperative. This 
has been clearly demonstrated by the Dutch case study. Both the government and 
industry were able to contribute to a policy leading to more energy efficiency. The 
signatories to the benchmarking covenant on energy efficiency have taken over 
certain obligations. Furthermore, the covenant is embedded into a framework of 
other policy measures such as the permits system at the local level, which 
indicates the high governance capacity of the government.  
5.3.2 Role of the political context 
Another important factor is the concrete political-cultural context in which volun-
tary agreements shall be developed. This is common practice for all political 
levels, from a supranational level like the EU level to the local level. Some con-
texts are quite supportive for voluntary agreements whereas other circumstances 
can hinder their development. Mol and Liefferink (2000) and De Clercq (2002) 
develop three supportive factors of the political-cultural context that can lead to 
the emergence of voluntary agreements: 
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• Firstly, voluntary agreements can better be developed in a climate of trust and 
consensus where public authorities and industry avoid conflict and are willing 
to co-operate closely in order to solve existing problems. The Netherlands has 
such a tradition, and a policy style of mutual trust between public authorities 
and industry as well as a problem-solving mode of decision-making still 
prevails.  
• Secondly, the existence of a credible threat is another important precondition 
for voluntary agreements. If such a threat does not exist, there is no incentive 
for industry to really take action and abate pollution (as this is often linked to 
additional costs). In the two case studies of the German and Czech voluntary 
agreements, a strong legislative threat existed and was clearly an incentive for 
industry to take action. In the Czech Republic, even a law had already been 
prepared and was ready to be decided on. This surely supported fast action of 
the detergent industry. 
• Thirdly, another condition supporting that voluntary agreements are concluded 
concerns the industry sector participating in voluntary agreements. If the sector 
is homogeneous and not too many parties take part in the negotiations, this is 
supportive for the achievement of the agreement. This thesis can be supported 
by the ACEA-agreement. The automotive industry is a highly concentrated 
sector with only 13 companies being organised in ACEA on the European 
level. A high level of organisation in a sector organisation being able to 
conduct negotiations with the public authority and being able to enforce the 
decision made under its members is also conducive for voluntary agreements. 
This is also valid for the Dutch, German and Czech cases where negotiations 
were conducted with the sector associations. 
It has to be kept in mind, that different political contexts have different impact on 
the emergence of voluntary agreements and on the design of voluntary agreements 
as well. This can be demonstrated comparing the design of the Dutch and Czech 
voluntary agreements. In the Netherlands, already a sophisticated environmental 
policy existed prior to the benchmarking agreement. The Dutch experiences with 
voluntary agreements supported the fact that the benchmarking covenant is not a 
stand-alone measure but is well integrated in a policy mix. On the contrary, volun-
tary agreements do not have a tradition in Czech Republic and there is no policy 
mix concerning phosphates in surface water. 
5.3.3 Initiation of an agreement and company participation 
Voluntary agreements can be initiated by public authorities as well as by industry. 
The actor that takes the first step has to convince the potential partner of the 
benefits of an agreement. While the government normally does not reject environ-
mental initiatives of industry, agreements that are initiated by public actors must 
show the industry the advantages of participating voluntarily.  
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The Dutch LTA probably provides the best information regarding the aspect of 
company participation, because not only branch organisations but also individual 
companies commit themselves to participate in the agreement. The evolved 
system of incentives and sanctions towards compliance is also used to push 
company participation by giving incentives and pushing through the threat of 
sanctions. The threats of stronger permit requirements together with the outlook 
on subsidies and a positive environmental image (corporate responsibility) are 
supportive. To communicate these benefits the role of business organisations is 
important.  
All in all, the management of the whole process is crucial also for company 
participation. Hence, this aspect will be highlighted in the conclusions (chapter 6). 
With regard to the transfer of the instrument it is maybe one of the most difficult 
tasks to develop and establish a framework of incentives and sanctions that 
support industry participation. The European cases are derived from a highly 
institutionalised and slowly grown system of environmental policy. Especially the 
Dutch system is a comprehensive framework built up in several years. Generally 
speaking, the case studies provide a comprehensive set of information, also for the 
development of a mode for China. Thereby, not only success factors but also 
contextual factors are important for the development of voluntary agreements. 
The Chinese situation has to be analysed carefully and a choice for a pilot study 
should be in line with these aspects.  
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6 Conclusion and preliminary suggestions for 
transferring European experiences 
 
In the European Union voluntary approaches and especially voluntary agreements 
are an integral part of the environmental policy mix. Not only on European level 
but also in the various nation states voluntary agreements have become an often-
used instrument to tackle pollution and climate change. However, not only the 
addressed environmental problems represent a big range of issues: the different 
forms of agreements, its scopes and measures, the parties involved as well as its 
success varies to a large extent. Even if the presented case studies demonstrate 
“good practice”, there is room for improvements and the instrument is 
incrementally developed further on. In this line, the voluntary approaches differ 
over time following the political priority of environmental problems. The 
benchmarking covenant is a good example of how voluntary agreements have 
evolved. 
With respect to the aim of the project to provide information about European 
experiences and deliver a basis and starting point for a comparative approach 
between China and Europe leading to a model for China, it is important to recog-
nise the fact that there is not the “one and only” model in Europe. The kind of 
agreements in Europe is as manifold as the different institutional and cultural 
backgrounds of the member states. The new member states of the European Union 
are confronted with rapid change. In contrast to that, in many “old” member states 
there is already a long tradition with different policy instruments. These traditions 
also vary: while for example Germany focused on the emission-regulation 
approach, Great Britain is more oriented towards procedural methods like e.g. 
project appraisals. 
Regarding voluntary agreements the experiences are heterogeneous. While in 
Germany, France and Italy agreements mostly took the form of commitments 
addressing phasing-out and reduction targets, in the Netherlands and Denmark the 
issue of climate change led to comprehensive framed agreements trying to create 
win-win situations between environment and economic development. Conse-
quently, the use of voluntary agreements and the developed models should fit to 
the concrete situation. That means that not only the issue but the context and insti-
tutional background are important for the choice and design of the model.  
The “common factor” in European voluntary agreements is the fact that public 
authorities and industry (single companies or sector associations) are working 
together to find common solutions. The use of the agreement is reasoned by 
efficient policy-making in terms of no need for regulation on the one hand side 
(public authorities) and reduction of transaction costs on the other side (industry). 
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Thereby a certain kind of effectiveness in order that industry can achieve environ-
mental objectives more effectively is expected. This aspect highlights the role of 
adaptiveness. In contrast to conventional command and control regulation, 
voluntary agreements have a long-term perspective and industry is more adapted 
to innovations and can determine its own speed.  
This last chapter provides some further concepts in order to support the transfer of 
experiences to the Chinese situation. Therefore, it highlights the process manage-
ment along different phases of the agreement and outlines some general elements 
of voluntary agreements. Finally, the nine steps towards successful agreements 
summarise the main findings. Before discussing these aspects, the following table 
summarises the main success factors as analysed in chapter 5.  
Table 23:  Overview of success factors 
Substantive dimension Success factors 
Problem 
solving 
capacity 
(environmental 
effectiveness) 
Ambitious targets leading to an 
improvement of the environmental 
situation 
Independent analysis of the problem 
Related to politically defined targets  
Going beyond business-as-usual-trends  
Quantified targets  
Time horizon and interim targets 
Compliance with agreed objectives Legally binding status 
Individual company responsibility  
Independent organisation 
Internal incentives and sanctions 
External incentives and sanctions 
Transparent reporting procedure 
Independent verification of reported results 
Long term policy learning and other 
soft effects 
Dissemination of information, transfer of 
knowledge 
Incorporation of intermediate organisation 
Institutionalisation of working groups 
Legitimacy Broad acceptance in society Information of the public, transparency 
Involvement of public interests (e.g. multi 
stakeholder dialogue) 
Costs Cost-effectiveness of voluntary 
agreement 
Cost calculation in advance 
No disproportionate burden for public 
authority 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
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6.1 Process management 
A consequence from the analysis of success factors out of the case studies is, that 
the success of voluntary agreements depends to a large extent on a well-structured 
process management. The agreement cannot be seen as a single document but a 
part of a policy process. Within that process three main phases can be identified: 
the launching, the negotiation and the implementation phase. While the launching 
and the negotiation phase are mainly related to “voluntariness”, the implemen-
tation phase possesses a rather compulsory character. 
During the first phase, the launching phase, the emphasis is placed on the target 
setting and on the establishment of relevant conditions for successful negotiations. 
This phase is characterized by the recognition and definition of the problem as 
well as its setting on the agenda. Subsequently, it is essential to identify respon-
sible actors, to establish a cooperative climate and to commonly start the dis-
course on problem solving. At that point, it is above all advantageous to attract 
possible actors through creating incentives and likewise “threatening” by showing 
alternatives for solving the problem.  
The following phase consists of conducting negotiations. In a consensual manner, 
all parties have to identify the optimal fields of intervention and to develop strate-
gies and corresponding measures for solving the environmental problem. Thereby, 
concrete aspects like an exact time frame, intermediate targets etc. are integral 
parts of the proceedings.  
The transition from the negotiation to the implementation phase will be expressed 
by the definite decision to tackle the problem and the signing of an agreement or 
commitment. In this phase, the task is to take measures and ensure compliance. 
Thereby, the focal point of process management is the development of a collabo-
ration strategy that is characterised by reporting and support mechanism (working 
groups etc.). Table 24 gives an overview of the three phases. Based on the success 
factors, it summarizes recommendations for successful action in each stage.  
Despite the existence of a “good” process management, there are also some risks 
within the process. In regard to flexibility for example, problems of free riding, 
non-compliance etc. must be prevented. In the constellation of negotiations 
between public authorities and industry, the danger of a regulatory capture and 
symbolic solutions (i.e. targets correspond to business-as-usual trend) is always 
present and should be avoided.  
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Table 24: The phases of process management 
Launching phase Set up an action strategy (e.g. AIDA20 concept) 
Organize a co-operative process 
Convince all participants of win-win situation 
Start with a simple sector 
Show alternative regulation (threat) 
Create incentives to participate 
Negotiation phase Define a clear time horizon 
Analyse the potential for emission reduction 
Define a “business as usual”-trend in order to set ambitious and 
realistic targets 
Set interim targets to allow earlier measurement of progress 
Integrate measures, monitoring, incentives and sanctions 
Implementation phase Create a monitoring procedure 
Carry out reports regularly 
Set up a working group for information exchange 
Adapt and modify the measures 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
 
6.2 Elements of a “best practice” agreement 
To ensure the success of a voluntary agreement, it is not crucial to elaborate a 
rather long and comprehensive document. In fact, a clearly structured agreement, 
in which the decisive aspects are precisely depicted, is much more useful. It 
includes the results elaborated during the launching phase as well as the resultant 
tasks of the implementation phase. Thus, the document is crucial for the success 
of the whole process. Therefore, it is recommended to integrate specific factors 
that can be regarded as “best practice” elements: 
• Purpose of the environmental agreement 
The main topic of the voluntary agreement is the denotation of the agree-
ment’s purpose through specifying the concerned environmental issue. 
Through explicitly defining the environmental problem that has occurred and 
additionally naming political environmental targets, the meaning of the 
agreement and its aim is explained, not only to the signing partner but also to 
courts and the public.  
                                                20	  	   AIDA	  is	  an	  acronym	  for	  a	  marketing	  concept	  and	  means	  Awareness,	  Interest,	  Desire	  and	  Action	  (e.g.	  Hackley	  2005:	  28)	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• Scope of applications and environmental targets 
To depict the fields of intervention precisely is an integral part of the 
agreement process. The involved parties have to decide about targets and 
measures. The definition of quantitative and qualitative targets within the 
overall objective is the main task of the agreement text. Thereby, intermediate 
targets as well as a concrete time frame have to be set up. 
 
• Actions by the parties in pursuit of the environmental targets 
Declarations of intent, identification of fields of intervention and the definition 
of environmental targets are of no account if no action follows on the 
agreement. The way from theoretical reflections to action is a critical part of 
the whole process. Therefore, supporting definition of actions to reach the 
targets, e.g. energy-efficiency measures, are strongly required. The elaborated 
catalogue of activities has to be itemized in the agreement text. To ensure the 
effectiveness of the process e.g. the institutionalisation of working groups and 
to include independent advice could be helpful. 
 
• Monitoring of the environmental agreement and monitoring indicators 
As all elaborated measures shall be applied effectively and the institutions 
(e.g. environmental learning groups) shall conduct their function, the progress 
towards the targets has to be constantly controlled. The agreement document 
must set the framework for the requirements concerning a regular reporting 
procedure and monitoring methodology. Comparable evaluation criteria, 
timing procedures to assess the process, as well as the responsible institution, 
preferably an independent consultancy, should be codified. The outcomes of 
the monitoring serve as the information base for the process management 
during the implementation phase.  
 
• Sanctions 
The charm of voluntary agreements results from their voluntariness. Never-
theless, agreements replace to a certain extent regulative measures. Incentives 
and sanctions built-in to the agreements can help to avoid possible failures like 
free-riding as well as ensuring serious measures. These sanctions have to be 
adequate for the specific situation. 
 
• Joining/validity of voluntary agreements and grounds for termination 
Formal requirements like the date of joining, the validity of the voluntary 
agreement and the grounds for termination are further and important elements 
of a best practice agreement, as they constitute the operating framework for 
the process and ensure a common definition of the tasks.  
 
92 H. Dalkmann, D. Bongardt, K. Rottmann, S. Hutfilter 
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy 
• Access to information 
An easy and good access to information maintains one of the key points for 
transparency. In case of non-dissemination of information on the process, the 
legitimacy of the agreement is not fully ensured. On the other hand side, 
sensible data cannot be fully published. Thus, it is highly recommended to 
incorporate the obligation on giving access to information into the agreement.  
 
The relevance of a well-structured agreement text is obvious, as the phases of the 
process possess opposed characters — voluntariness (launching/negotiation 
phase) versus obligation (implementation phase), which have to be both 
considered. Therefore, the balance between flexibility and demand for success in 
defining targets, introducing measures etc. has to be constantly ensured, as it is 
crucial for the process to come off. 
6.3 Nine steps towards a successful agreement 
An integrated view on success factors is possible by designing a process manage-
ment strategy. Instead of a summary, nine decisive steps will be outlined that 
show — in brief — how “good” process management can be implemented and a 
successful environmental agreement can be reached. Thereby, it should be 
stressed that the process shall not be reduced on few proceedings. In fact, many 
steps recur or will be accompanied by further activities. Furthermore, these steps 
constitute proposals that should not be regarded as instructions, but as 
recommendations. 
At the beginning of the agreement process, awareness concerning an environmental 
problem should be raised, followed by the declaration of the overall target to tackle it. 
The raising of interest, mainly caused by naming the problem, leads to the setting up 
of a cooperation of collaborative actors (2). This is accompanied respectively 
followed by the offering of incentives (3) to render the agreement attractive for more 
related companies. Reaching the fourth step, the commencement of the negotiation 
process on targets, measures, monitoring etc. is on the agenda. Thereby, it is 
recommended to define (intermediate) ambitious targets and to set up a clear time 
horizon to prevent a business-as-usual scenario. Decisions on organisational 
structures should be passed as well, to involve for example independent actors in the 
monitoring process. In the next step, the agreement will be concluded (5). The sixth 
and one of the most important steps constitutes the control of action through 
monitoring. That should be accompanied by the promotion of information 
dissemination (7), as it supports transparency and constitutes — for government and 
private actors — a further instrument to control the process. To assess the efforts and 
to estimate if the process is on a promising way, precise and detailed monitoring and 
reporting procedures are required (8). To ensure comparability of the results, 
monitoring and reporting should be conducted regularly and by an independent 
consultancy. The application of sanctions marks the last step and should be carried 
out in case of non-compliance of agreed targets. After the final evaluation, actors 
have to decide if new or further problems exist and, if needed, to restart the process. 
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Figure 11:  Nine steps towards a successful agreement process 
 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
An important point within this scheme is the offer of incentives for industry. In 
the case of energy efficiency, energy savings lead to a reduction of costs. For 
future research, an outlook towards the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol 
could be useful. The opportunity of incorporating a CDM clause as an incentive 
for signing voluntary agreements by linking them with the Clean Development 
Mechanism should be assessed. The Clean Development Mechanism facilitates 
climate friendly investment in countries in transition by granting tradable emis-
sion reduction certificates for projects that lower greenhouse gas emission. Never-
theless, incorporating a CDM clause into voluntary agreements as an incentive to 
sign thus requires careful consideration of legal specificities of the international 
climate change policy regime. Thus, CDM could maybe constitute a useful 
supplement to voluntary agreements, but cannot replace them. Due to the complex 
context conditions, further research is needed. 
This study provides a broad range of information regarding European experiences 
with voluntary agreements. The major tasks, elements and steps have been identified. 
There are several factors important to recognise. The future task is to reflect the 
results together with the Chinese partners and draw conclusions for the comparative 
study. The Chinese situation — regarding environmental problems, the political and 
administrative system as well as political traditions — has to be considered and 
mirrored with the European experiences. The forthcoming task is to analyse, where 
voluntary agreements can be introduced as a successful tool of industrial 
environmental management. It has to be identified, which role the different presented 
voluntary agreement options could play in China’s environmental policy. 
1 Appoint problems and define targets
2      Establish a cooperation
4     Negotiate on targets, measures and monitoring
5    Conclude and implement the agreement
6 Control action through monitoring
7 Promote information dissemination
8        Communicate intermediate reports
9       Apply sanctions if needed
3 Offer incentives
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Interviews 
Interview with Dr. Baunemann, Association of Synthetic Producing Industries (VKE), 
22.11.2004 
Interview with Johann Flint, Benchmarking Verification Bureau Energy, 19.11.2004 
Interview with Mr. Franz, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety/Germany, 30.11.2004 
 
Further contacts (telephone and e-mail) 
Federal Environmental Agency/Germany 
Mr. Tietjen 
Federal Ministry of the Environment/Austria 
Mr. Kind 
Federal Minitry of Economics and Labour/Austria 
Mr. Liedl  
Danish Environmental Protection Agency/Denmark 
Mrs. Maio 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs/United Kingdom 
Mr. Heywood 
Spanish Institute for Energy Diversification and Saving (IDAE)/Spain 
Mrs. Blanco 
The Polish National Energy Conservation Agency/Poland 
Mr. Wnuk 
Association of Synthetic Processing Agency (VKE) 
Mr. Baunemann 
Association of the Chemical Industry (VCI) 
Mr. Skalicky 
Association of the Chemical Industry (VCI) 
Mr. Schröder 
Association of Textile, Leather, Tanning agent and Washing raw materials Industry 
(TEGEWA) 
Mr. Ungeheuer 
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Links concerning the case studies 
The Long Term Agreements on energy efficiency and the bench-
marking covenant – the case of the breweries  
 
Institution 
concerned 
Role of the institution Reference 
Ministry of Economic 
Affairs 
Supreme authority that represents one of the 
signatories to the Dutch Long Term Agreement 
and the benchmarking covenant 
http://www.minez.nl/ 
Ministry for Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the 
Environment 
Supreme authority that represents one of the 
signatories to the benchmarking covenant 
http://www.vrom.nl/pagina.html 
The Confederation of 
Netherlands Industry and 
Employers (VNO-NCW) 
VNO-NCW is the largest employers’ organi-
sation in the Netherlands (170 (branch) asso-
ciations); constitutes one of the signatories to the 
Dutch Long Term Agreement and the bench-
marking covenant 
http://www.vno-ncw.nl 
 
SenterNovem Dutch Energy Agency; serves as independent 
third party in the agreement process; had the 
executive responsibility of the LTA programme 
http://www.senternovem.nl/ 
senternovem/ 
Dutch Brewers’ Asso-
ciation (Centraal 
Brouwerij Kantoor/CBK) 
CBK represents the interests of nine breweries in 
The Netherlands, who are responsible for 99,9 
per cent of the total beer production in the coun-
try; one of the main actors within the bench-
marking of the breweries  
http://www.cbk.nl/ 
Benchmarking Committee 
/ Verification Bureau 
Energy (VBE) 
Independent authority that controls and monitors 
the implementation of the benchmarking 
covenant  
http://www.benchmarking-
energie.nl/ 
KWA Business 
Consultants 
Independent agency, incorporated in the bench-
marking process  
http://www.kwa.nl/ 
102 H. Dalkmann, D. Bongardt, K. Rottmann, S. Hutfilter 
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy 
ACEA-agreement on the reduction of CO2 from passenger cars 
 
Institution 
concerned 
Role of the institution Reference 
European Commission - 
Directorate General Enter-
prise and Industry 
Public authority that develops environmental 
policies for trade and industry; one of the signa-
tories to the agreement 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise
/index_en.htm 
European Parliament 
 
The European Parliament represents the EU's 
citizens and is directly elected by them; one of 
the parties that are taking part in the monitoring 
http://europa.eu.int/institutions/ 
parliament/index_en.htm 
Council of the European 
Union 
The Council of the European Union represents 
the individual member states; one of the parties 
that are taking part in the monitoring 
http://europa.eu.int/institutions/ 
council/index_en.htm 
 
European Automobile 
Manufacturers Association 
(ACEA) 
The multi-national association represents the 13 
major automobile manufacturers in the European 
Union (e.g. BMW, Volvo); one of the signatories 
to the agreement 
http://www.acea.be 
 
World Wide Found 
(WWF) 
A Non-Governmental Organisation and nature 
association that is one of the main critics of the 
ACEA agreement 
http://www.wwf.org/europe 
 
Agreement on gradual reduction of impact of laundry detergents on 
the environment 
 
Institution concerned Role of the institution Reference 
Czech Soap and Detergent 
Products Association 
(CSDPA) 
The national association represents several 
national and international producers and dis-
tributors of soaps and detergents that were active 
on the Czech market; it constitutes one of the 
signatories to the agreement 
http://www.csdpa.cz 
Ministry of the 
Environment 
Supreme authority that represents one of the 
signatories to the agreement 
http://www.env.cz 
Institute of Chemical 
Technology, Prague/Czech 
Republic  
(former Chemical and 
Technology College)  
Independent institution whose experts were in-
corporated in the monitoring 
http://www.vscht.cz/main/ index.html 
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Commitment on phasing out of polybrominated diphenylethers 
(PBDE) as flame retardant in synthetic materials 
 
Institution concerned Role of the institution Reference 
Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Con-
servation and Nuclear 
Safety 
Public authority that constitutes one of the sig-
natories to the agreement 
www.bmu.de/ 
Federal Environmental 
Agency 
Public authority that constitutes one of the sig-
natories to the agreement 
http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/ 
Federal Institute for Mate-
rials Research and Testing 
Public authority; incorporated in preparatory 
talks 
http://www.bam.de/index4.htm 
Association of the Chemi-
cal Industry (VCI) 
Umbrella organisation, represents all branch 
associations within the chemical industry; one of 
the signatories of the commitment 
http://www.vci.de/default.asp 
PlasticsEurope 
(former Association of 
Synthetics Processing 
Industries) 
Addressed branch association of the VCI http://www.vke.de/de/index.php 
 



